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This report, prepared with the participation of experts from the Institute of the Economy and Transport Development, presents the results of 
quantitative assessment of freight traffi   growth prospects along the China–EAEU–EU axis. The report provides a description of general 
trends affecting development of freight transport subject to commodity structure and mode of transport. Special attention is paid to factors driving 
changes in freight traffi The authors present their view of the impact that freight rates have on the metrics of freight traffi being rechannelled to 
EAEU transport infrastructure and the operation of certain factors, such as regularity (rhythmicity) and timeframes of cargo deliveries. The fi     part 
of the report offers an assessment of additional freight traffi  which may be attracted to transport routes along the China–EAEU–EU axis, in the short 
and long term. 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
INTRODUCTION   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
 
1 .  GENERAL TRENDS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT 
OF FREIGHT TRAFFIC ALONG THE PRC–EAEU–EU AXIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
1 .1 . EAEU–PRC Freight Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
1 .2 . PRC–EU Freight Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
1 .3 .   Methodological  Approach  to  Selecting  Container  Cargoes 
Switchable to Railway Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
1 .4 . Main Factors Shaping Distribution of Freight Traffic 
among Modes of Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
 
2 .  ASSESSMENT OF FREIGHT RATE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR 
CONTAINER FREIGHT SERVICES: IMPACT OF COST ON FREIGHT TRAFFIC   .  . 32 
2 .1 . Maritime Container Freight Rates 
and Their Impact on Land Freight Traffic   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
2 .2 .  Railway Container Freight Rates and Their Impact on Freight Traffi      .   . 34 
3 .  “CONVENIENCE”  ELASTICITY  OF  DEMAND  FOR  CONTAINER  FREIGHT 
SERVICES: IMPACT OF SPEED AND REGULARITY ON FREIGHT TRAFFIC  .  .  .  . .41 
4 .  ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL FREIGHT TRAFFIC GROWTH 
ALONG THE CHINA–EAEU–EU AXIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
4 .1 . Assessment of Additional Freight Traffic Served 
by Railway Routes between EAEU Member States and China  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 45 
4 .2 . Assessment of Additional Freight Traffic 
Served by Railway Routes between EU Countries and China  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 48 
4 .3 . Assessment of Additional Freight Traffic Served 
by Railway Routes between EAEU Member States and the EU  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 50 
4 .4 . Aggregated Assessment of Additional Freight Traffic 
along the China–EAEU–EU Axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
ATTACHMENT 1    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
 
ATTACHMENT 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
  
Table A . Impact of Railway Container Freight Rates on Container Traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Table  B .  Changes  in  Container  Trains’  Frequency  of  Departure  and  Volume  of  Freight 
Traffic along PRC–Europe–PRC Routes, 2011–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Table 1 . Cargoes Not Suitable for Container Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Table 2 . Containerisable Cargoes that Could be Switched to Railway Transport   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Table  3 .  Interrelation  of  Factors  Affecting  Selection  of  Maritime/Railway  Transport  to  Carry 
Container Cargoes and Best Option for the Consignor Subject to Economic Conditions in 2016   .  .  .31 
Table  4  .  EU-Bound  Container  Traffic  Subsidies  Provided  by  Regional  Chinese  Authorities,   Effective 
Years and Average Subsidised Through Freight Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
Table 5 . Changes in Railway Container Freight Rates and Volume of Freight Traffic 
along PRC–Europe Routes (Estimated Freight Rate Elasticity of Demand), 2011–2016 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 38 
Table  6 .  Volume  of  Container  Traffic  Carried  by  Regular  China–Europe  Container  Trains, 
2011–2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 
Table 7 .  Changes in Container Trains’ Frequency of Departure and Volume of Freight Traffic 
along PRC–Europe–PRC Routes, 2011–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
Table A2 .1 .  Changes in Mutual Trade between the EAEU and China in Value and Volume 
Terms, 2007–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Table A2 .2 . Changes in Mutual Trade between the EU and China in Value and Volume 
Terms, 2007–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Table A2 .3 .   Comparative  Changes  in  Freight  Indices  and  Volume  of  Container  Traffic 
along PRC–Europe Routes, 2009–2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Table A2 .4 . Commodity Structure of Export Railway Container Traffic from Russia to China  
through Crossing Points at the Border with China, 2010–2016, by Volume, Thousand FEU .  .  .  .  .  . 59 
Table A2 .5 . Commodity Structure of Import Railway Container Traffic from China to Russia  
through Crossing Points at the Border with China, 2010–2016, by Volume, Thousand FEU .  .  .  .  .  . 59 
Table A2 .6 . Weekly China–Europe Container Trains Schedule (since January 2018) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 60 
Table  A2  .7 .  Changes  in,  Commodity  and  Geographical  Structure  of,  Import  by  EAEU 
Member States from China of Cargoes Switchable to Railway Container Transport, 
2007–2016, Thousand Tons/Thousand FEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 64 
Table A2 .8 . Commodity Structure of Transit Railway Container Traffic from China to the EU  
through Crossing Points at the Border with China, 2010–2016, by Volume, Thousand FEU .  .  .  .  .  . 65 
Table A2 .9 . Changes in and Commodity Structure of, Import by EU Countries from China 
of Cargoes Switchable to Railway Container Transport, 2007–2016, Thousand Tons   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 65 
Table A2 .10 . Commodity Structure of Transit Railway Container Traffic from the EU to China 
through Crossing Points at the Border with China, 2010–2016, by Volume, Thousand FEU .  .  .  .  .  . 66 
Table A2 .11 . Changes in and Commodity Structure of, Export by EU Countries to China 
of Cargoes Switchable to Railway Container Transport, 2007–2016, Thousand Tons   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 66 
Table  A2  .12 .  Changes  in,  Commodity  and  Geographical  Structure  of,  Export  by  EAEU 
Member States to the EU of Cargoes Switchable to Railway Container Transport, 
2007–2016, Thousand Tons/Thousand FEU   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
Table  A2 .13 .  Changes  in,  Commodity  and  Geographical  Structure  of,  Import 
by EAEU Member States from the EU of Cargoes Switchable to Railway Container 
Transport, 2007–2016, Thousand Tons/Thousand FEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure A . Changes in Railway Container Freight Rates and Volume of Freight Traffic 
along PRC–Europe Routes (Estimated Freight Rate Elasticity of Demand) . 
Scenario Envisaging Freight Rate Reduction to $4,000 per FEU by 2030  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9 
Figure  B .  Changes  in  Railway  Container  Freight  Rates  and  Volume  of  Freight  Traffic 
along PRC–Europe Routes (Estimated Freight Rate Elasticity of Demand) . 
Scenario Envisaging Freight Rate Retention at $5,500 per FEU  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Figure  C .  Changes  in  Container  Trains’  Frequency  of  Departure  and  Volume  of  Freight 
Traffic along PRC–Europe–PRC Routes, 2011–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Figure D .  Maximum Container Traffic that Could Be Additionally Attracted 
by EAEU Railway Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 
Figure 1 . The Main Trans-Eurasian Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 
Figure 2 .  Changes in Export Railway Container Traffic from Russia to China 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points, 2013–2016, Thousand TEU   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 
Figure 3 . Structure of Export Railway Container Traffic from Russia to China 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 
Figure 4 .  Changes in  Import Railway  Container Traffic  from China  to Russia 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points, 2013–2016, Thousand TEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 
Figure 5 . Structure of Import Railway Container Traffic from China to Russia 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 
Figure 6 . Commodity Structure of EU Railway-Carried Exports to China in 2016, % . . . . . . . . . .  .  . 23 
Figure 7 . Commodity Structure of EU Railway-Carried Imports from China in 2016, % . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Figure 8 .  Changes in Transit Railway Container Traffic from the EU to China 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points, 2013–2016, by Volume, Thousand TEU  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25 
Figure 9 .  Structure of Transit Railway Container Traffic from the EU to China 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Figure 10 .  Changes in Transit Railway Container Traffic from China to the EU 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points, 2013–2016, by Volume, Thousand TEU  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 26 
Figure 11 . Structure of Transit Railway Container Traffic from China to the EU 
with a Breakdown by Border Crossing Points in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Figure 12 .  Changes  in Freight Indices and Volume of Container Traffic 
along APR–Europe Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Figure 13 . Scenario 1—Further Freight Rate Reduction . Changes in Railway Container 
Freight Rates and Volume of Freight Traffic along PRC–Europe Routes 
(Estimated Freight Rate Elasticity of Demand), 2011–2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Figure 14 .  Scenario 2—No Freight Rate Change .  Railway Container Freight Rates 
and Volume of Freight Traffic along PRC–Europe Routes (Estimated Freight Rate 
Elasticity of Demand), 2011–2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 
Figure 15 .  Changes  in  Container  Trains’  Frequency  of  Departure  and  Volume  of  Freight 
Traffic along PRC–Europe–PRC Routes, 2011–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
Figure 16 . Actual Volume of Container Traffic along the PRC-EAEU–EU Axis Served 
by Railway Transport in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Figure 17 .   Maximum  Container  Traffic  that  Could  Be  Additionally  Attracted 
by EAEU Railway Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
Figure A1 .1 . Commodity Structure of EAEU Exports to China in 2016, % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
Figure A1 .2 . Commodity Structure of EAEU Imports from China in 2016, % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
  
 
 
APR — Asia-Pacific Region 
BRI — Belt and Road Initiative 
EAEU — Eurasian Economic Union 
EDB — Eurasian Development Bank 
EDB Centre for Integration Studies — Centre for Integration Studies 
of the Eurasian Development Bank 
EU — European Union 
FEACN — Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Nomenclature . 
Classification of goods used for customs operations in EAEU member states 
FEU — Forty Foot Equivalent Unit, a conventional unit used to describe 
the cargo capacity of container carriers and container terminals 
HS Code — Harmonised System Code 
IMF — International Monetary Fund 
KTZ — JSC National Company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy 
(National Railway Company of Kazakhstan) 
OECD — Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PRC — People’s Republic of China 
TEU — Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit, a conventional unit used to describe 
the cargo capacity of container carriers and container terminals 
TLC — Transport and Logistics Centre 
UNCTAD — United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
WTO — World Trade Organisation 
 7 
 
 
  
 
Summary 
• Growth of transit container traffic through the EAEU will be contingent on 
development of trade between the PRC and the EU. Currently about 98% of mutual 
EU–China deliveries are made by maritime transport, with aviation transport and 
railway transport accounting for 1.5–2% and 0.5–1%, respectively. Approximately 80% 
of EU–China cargoes are carried in containers, including about 90% of cargoes 
brought to the EU from China (imports) and 70–75% of car- goes carried from the EU to 
China (exports). 
• Practically all EAEU exports to the PRC are solid and liquid bulk cargoes, while 
most imports from China are delivered in containers. Export freight traffic from 
EAEU member states to China has a low share of container cargoes (about 1.5–2%) 
due to the absolute domination in commodity structure of “un- containerisable” cargoes 
(Fuel, Mineral Raw Materials, Timber, Mineral Fertilisers, Agricultural Raw Materials). 
Over the last 10 years, the share of container cargoes in total EAEU imports from China 
has considerably increased (from 35% to 55%). The commodity structure of freight traffic 
from China, already dominated by con- tainerisable cargoes, stimulates continued 
containerisation. 
• An analysis of the commodity structure of Eurasian freight transport in terms of 
customs value of goods per unit of mass, consumer properties of goods and 
technological characteristics of their prepacking, packaging, transport and logis- tics, has 
yielded a list of cargoes suitable for the switch from maritime transport to railway 
transport. Primarily those are: Consumer Goods, Engineering Products and certain Non-
Ferrous Metals (e.g. Nickel Products). 
• It is anticipated that railway container traffic between the EU and China 
(transiting through the EAEU) will increase. To attract additional freight traf- fic 
between the EU and the PRC, EAEU member states need to further expand their transport 
infrastructure and remove a number of barriers. There has been a consi- derable increase in 
railway container traffic from the EU to China, from 1,300 TEU in 2010 to more than 
50,000 TEU in 2016. Between 2010–2016, transit container traffic from China to the 
EU increased from 5,600 TEU to almost 100,000 TEU. At the end of 2017, the volume 
of transit container traffic across the EAEU along the China–Europe–China route 
reached 262,000 TEU, exceeding the 2016 value by a factor of 1.8. 
• Increase of container traffi along the PRC–EAEU–EU axis was largely suppor- ted by 
railway transport subsidies provided by China. Our analysis shows that the annual 
doubling of the number of container trains and volume of container cargoes along PRC–
EAEU–EU routes in 2013–2016 was largely attributable to sub- sidisation of export railway 
freight traffi by Chinese authorities. With the Chinese transit container freight rate reduced 
almost to zero, cargo fl ws generated by Chi- nese exporters rapidly switched from sea 
routes to railway transport. 
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• According to our estimates, total subsidies provided by Chinese authorities 
amounted to about $88 million in 2016. This estimate assumes an average 
container transport subsidy of $2,500 per FEU, with the total number of subsi- dised 
containers originating from central PRC provinces standing at 35,000 FEU. An average 
subsidy per FEU has been merely 0.3–0.4% of the total value of con- tainer-shipped 
cargoes. 
• Preservation and expansion of transport subsidies by Chinese provinces, is the 
key driver of continued container traffi growth. The growth of rail- way container 
traffi between China and the EU in 2011–2017 from 7,000 FEU to 131,000 FEU  (or  
from  14,000  TEU  to  262,000  TEU)  has  been  achieved at a through railway 
freight rate of $4,800–6,000 per FEU  (subsidised  by about 40%) (Figure A). Subsidy-
driven reduction of China–Europe railway contai- ner freight rates by 30–50%, has 
resulted in a 19-fold increase of container traffic. 
• The current through freight rate (including subsidies) of $5,500 per FEU, may en- 
courage further growth of container traffic to 200–250,000 FEU in 2020 (a twofold 
increase over three years). After that, keeping the freight rate at $5,500 per FEU will no 
longer produce such a pronounced effect and container traffic growth rates will 
dramatically decrease (Figure B). 
• Container traffic increase from 200–250,000 FEU in 2020 to 500,000 FEU by 2030, is 
possibly subject to further reduction of the through freight rate by $1,500 per FEU 
(from $5,500 per FEU to $4,000 per FEU) (Table A). 
• Inferior capacity of crossing points at the Belarus–Poland border, remains one of 
the key barriers to the growth of container traffic along the PRC– EAEU–EU 
axis. This issue will be discussed at length in the next EDB Centre for Integration 
Studiesʼ report, which will focus on the impact that non-tariff barriers have on transit 
potential and on development of transport corridors in EAEU mem- ber states. 
Conclusion: We believe that explosive growth of container traffic until 2019–
2020 is secured. After it plateaus, a lower freight rate will be required to secure 
further growth. It may be supported by investments (in physical infrastructure, 
transport and logistics centres, locomotives, border crossing infrastructure,  
electronic  technologies,  etc.)   and/or   by   coordination of freight rate policies at 
the Greater Eurasian level. 
 
 
Table A. 
Impact of Railway 
Container Freight 
Rates on Container 
Traffic 
 
Source: 
authors’ estimations 
 
 
 
Reduction by 40% 
(from $9,000 to $5,500) 
Growth from 7 to 131
 
 
 
Reduction by 30% 
(from $5,500 to $4,000) 2–2.5-fold growth (to 500) 
Period 
Change in Container Freight Rate 
(per FEU) 
Change in Freight Traffic, 
Thousand FEU 
2018–2020 
Rate not changed 
(stays at $5,500) 
1.5–2-fold growth (to 200–250) 
2011–2017 
2021–2030 
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• Railway container transport has certain advantages (compared to maritime trans- port) in 
the following areas: speed (timeframe), regularity (rhythmicity), reli- ability 
(guaranteed on-schedule delivery and cargo preservation) and the ability to deliver the 
cargo to any destination. 
• In the next two or three years, all regular trains from China that are “placed on 
track” will be fully loaded. According to our estimates, “convenience” elas- ticity of 
demand (“convenience” including promptness, regularity and preci- sion of delivery) 
in railway container services between China and Europe, stands at 98%: in 2011–2016, 
the number of weekly train departures and the volume of container traffic have been 
growing virtually at the same rate (Figure C). 
• Strict adherence to railway schedules (99.7% of all container trains running along China–
Europe routes complete their journeys on schedule) and delivery times ap- proximately 
one-third of what is offered by maritime transport, guarantee a wide margin of 
“convenience”. 
• According to our estimates, if current through freight rates are preserved 
(including Chinese subsidies), the China–Europe container traffic growth 
potential generated by the margin of “convenience” (promptness, regular- ity and 
precision of delivery) is far from exhausted. By 2020, it may produce a manifold 
increase in the number of container trains and total volume of contai- ner traffic (to reach 
200–250,000 FEU), with the number of train departures per week (regularity) going up 
by a factor of three (to about 100 per week) (Table B). 
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• The existing potential of export traffic originating from Russia is all but ex- hausted. 
It is necessary to find new containerisable niche products that will enjoy demand in 
the capacious Chinese market, for example, Food Products (including Refrigerated 
Goods), Prepacked Chemical and Petrochemical Products or Engineering 
Products. 
• According to our calculations, the maximum additional container traffi that can be 
attracted to EAEU railway networks is estimated at 2.7 million FEU (5.4 mil- lion 
TEU), including West–East traffi of 325,000 FEU (550,000 TEU) and East–West traffi  of 
2,375,000 FEU (4,750,000 TEU) (Figure D): 
EAEU China—50,000 FEU (100,000 TEU) 
EU China—150,000 FEU (300,000 TEU) 
EU EAEU—125,000 FEU (250,000 TEU) 
China EAEU—250,000 FEU (500,000 TEU) China 
EU—2,100,000 FEU (4,200,000 TEU) EAEU 
EU—25,000 FEU (50,000 TEU) 
However, the large imbalance between existing and additional West–East and East–
West freight traffic may prevent EAEU railway networks from attracting all potential 
freight traffic along the China–EAEU–EU axis. 
• With balanced container loads (containers travelling both ways fully loaded with 
optimal cargoes; no empty containers), additional container traffi that may be 
attracted by EAEU railway networks is estimated at 500–550,000 FEU, while total 
freight traffi  along the axis (including existing traffi   may be as high as 650,000 
FEU. 
If the existing East–West/West–East container traffi imbalance (2:1) persists and 
West–East trains additionally take on  any  containerisable  cargoes (subject to 
adequate  development  of  transport  and  logistical  infrastructure in EAEU member 
states and subject further to active cooperation of EAEU railway companies with their 
counterparts in China and the EU and with consignors/ consignees potentially 
interested in using railway transport), aggregate railway container traffi along the 
China–EAEU–EU axis could, in the long term, reach up to 1 million FEU per year. 
Table B. 
Changes in Contai- 
ner Trains’ Frequen- 
cy of Departure and 
Volume of Freight 
Traffic along PRC– 
Europe–PRC 
Routes, 2011–2020 
 
Source: 
China Railways 
Container 
Transport Co. Ltd 
(CRCT) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020* 
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Figure D. 
Maximum Container 
Traffic that Could 
Be Additionally 
Attracted by EAEU 
Railway Networks 
 
Source: 
authors’ 
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Introduction 
One of the key advantages of continental cooperation within the Eurasian space, is that it 
makes it possible to boost transport capacity and enhance related infrastruc- ture. Efforts in this 
area will produce a number of positive effects, the most important being a more extensive use 
of the transport capacity wielded by EAEU countries, lo- calisation of industrial production 
along trans-Eurasian transport corridors, growth of exports and stronger cohesion among 
intra-continental states and regions. The key players in this process are China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus and EU member states. 
The urgency of this matter rises sharply in the context of the interface between the 
EAEU and the Chinese BRI. For China, this initiative is closely linked with the 
development prospects of its western and northeastern provinces. China is inter- ested in 
using land routes to promote products manufactured in its western prov- inces (Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai) and northeastern 
provinces (Nei Mongol, Heilongjiang). For China, it is strategically important to overcome 
imbalances in economic development of its inland regions and primarily, to bridge the gap 
between the lagging western provinces and the more advanced eastern provinces. To do that, 
the government of the PRC is implementing a set of measures designed to build up a new 
transport infrastructure that will pro- mote the growth of westbound cargo flows. 
For EAEU member states, involvement with the Chinese BRI is equally relevant. Their 
key task is to resolve domestic problems related to transport and logistics in- frastructure, 
containerisation of the economy and optimisation of industry regula- tions, tax 
administration, etc. This will generate intensive growth of internal, inter- regional freight 
traffic, reinforce regional links and improve the logistical positions of landlocked regions, 
such as the Russian Urals and Siberia and all of Central Asia (Libman, 2016; Karaganov et 
al., 2015; Syroezhkin, 2016; Toops, 2016). 
A number of EU countries with railway connections to Asia have already begun, albeit on a 
limited scale, to make use of the advantages offered by trans-Eurasian transport corridors. 
European transport and logistical companies and consumers of transport services have taken 
a cautious stance with respect to the new opportunities opened up by transcontinental transit 
and in some cases lack reliable information (including information about carriage terms and 
costs, cargo delivery times, etc.). 
In the context of the BRI transport theme, this is primarily a “container story”. Most 
opportunities associated with transit traffic along BRI routes are related to the use of 
containers. Container transport remains virtually the only method of delivery of Eurasian 
transit cargoes. The use of containers guarantees preservation of cargo, standard 
dimensions, reduced packaging costs, accelerated cargo handling, unified shipping 
documents and facilitated forwarding. If the bulk of freight traffic along the China–
EAEU–EU axis does switch to land routes, it will be using 20 and 40-foot containers 
(Vinokurov, 2017). 
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This gives rise to the need for a comprehensive academic and applied research 
program to review the potential and prospects of developing trans-Eurasian land 
transport corridors, related transport and logistics infrastructure as well as the bar- riers to 
robust trade and economic relations among the countries lying along the PRC–EAEU–
EU axis (Figure 1). 
Accordingly, the logic of this report deals sequentially with the critical issues de- scribed 
below. In Section 1, we look at the current state of trade and the commodity structure of it 
between EAEU member states and China and between China and the EU (in terms of value 
and volume) as well as changes to it. We offer a brief analysis of the commodity structure of 
freight traffic among the relevant countries/integration as- sociations and of the way it 
changes over time (with a special emphasis on container cargoes) and describe the general 
trends affecting development of trans-Eurasian freight traffic along the PRC–EAEU–EU 
axis. Section 1 also presents the method- ological approach that was used to select 
container cargoes switchable to railway transport and a brief description of the main factors 
that determine the distribution (attraction) of freight traffic by transport modes employed to 
deliver cargoes along the China–EAEU–EU axis. 
Section 2 presents an expert evaluation of the impact of the cost factor on the met- rics of 
freight traffic to be switched to the EAEU transport infrastructure (assessment of freight rate 
elasticity of demand for container freight services). 
In Section 3, we review cargo delivery regularity (rhythmicity) and timeframes with a 
breakdown by transport modes (routes) and assess the impact that those factors have on the 
metrics of freight traffi to be switched to the EAEU transport infrastructure (assessment of 
the “convenience” elasticity of demand in container freight services). 
Our comprehensive analysis of freight traffic along the China–EAEU–EU axis and of the 
factors affecting that traffic, has yielded an estimate of additional cargo flows (with a 
breakdown by commodity groups and traffic volume) that may be attracted to transport 
routes traversing the EAEU. 
All supplementary materials are presented in attachments to this report. 
The information base of our research includes the following materials: 
— official information published by statistical agencies of EAEU and EU member states 
and the PRC and by certain international organisations (WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, IMF, 
World Bank). 
— statistical  information  provided  by   transport   and   logistical   companies of 
EAEU member states (Russian Railways, KTZ, The Belarusian Railway), the EU and the 
PRC. 
— data provided by research and analysis centres (organisations) from Russia (and 
other EAEU member states), European and Asian countries, as well as other (including 
international) research and analysis centres (organisations), informa- tion agencies and 
mass media. 
— data and qualitative assessments provided by independent experts and re- search 
teams. 
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The main source of information and analysis related to maritime transport was the 
annual UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, which contains materials on de- 
velopment of global maritime transport, as well as information on current rates and 
changes in freight rates charged for maritime container freight services along key routes 
(North America–APR/China, Europe–APR/China, South America– APR/China, 
Australia–APR/China, Africa–APR/China, Middle East–APR/China, internal APR 
routes). In addition, recent data on maritime container freight rates were obtained from 
the Shanghai Shipping Exchange, which has been publishing relevant indices (Shanghai 
Containerised Freight Index) since 2009. 
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Figure 1. 
The Main Trans- 
Eurasian Corridors 
 
Source: 
EDB 
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1. General Trends Affecting Development 
of Freight Traffic Along the PRC–EAEU–EU Axis 
 
1.1. EAEU–PRC Freight Traffic 
In 2016, mutual trade turnover between the EAEU and China (by volume) reached its 
highest level in 10 years at 130 million tons1 per year. Still, its value parameters on the 
global scale remain quite modest (despite their 1.5-fold increase over the decade). The 
increase of EAEU–China turnover was almost completely attributable to a 75% growth of 
EAEU exports to China, which amounted to 117 million tons in 2016. EAEU imports 
from China are smaller, at a steady 15 million tons per year (Attachment 2, Table A2.1). 
Russia, the largest EAEU economy, strongly dominates the structure of EAEU foreign trade 
freight traffic (see Attachment 1). 
Land freight traffic between the EAEU and the PRC is supported primarily by railway 
transport. According to Russian foreign trade statistics, at the end of 2016 the vol- ume of 
railway-carried Russian exports to China, amounted to about 24 million tons, a more than 30 
million ton decrease relative to 2011–2013 (mostly due to reduction of Iron Ore supplies). 
About half of railway freight traffic from Russia to China (an average of 10–13 million 
tons per year) consists of Timber (Round Timber and Sawn Timber). Railways are also used 
to carry significant volumes of the following to Chi- na: Mineral Raw Materials and 
Chemical Raw Materials (such as Iron Ore or Sulphur among others, between 6–11 million 
tons per year), Mineral Fertilisers (about 2 mil- lion tons per year), Fuel (mostly Hard Coal, 
about 1.8 million tons per year) and Pulp and Paper Products (0.9 million tons per year). 
According to Russian foreign trade statistics, only about 1% of railway-carried Rus- sian 
exports to China are delivered in containers (150–200,000 tons per year, net). Russian 
Railways statistics, which feature multimodal China-bound cargoes as part of railway-
carried exports (railway/maritime or railway/road) including the weight of containers, 
claim a higher share of container cargoes at 2–4%. 
An analysis of Russian Railways statistics on export railway container traffic from Russia 
to China, as expressed in TEU (records maintained since 2010), reveals that over the last 
seven years, such traffic has increased by a factor of 2.5, from 69,000 TEU in 2010 to 171,000 
TEU in 2016. Only 10-20% of that container traffic (21,000 TEU in 2016) actually crosses 
the border with China, meaning that the bulk of China- bound railway container traffic is 
transhipped through seaports (multimodal deliv- eries). Virtually all railway container 
traffic crossing a land border with China goes through Zabaykalsk (80–100%, declining) 
and Grodekovo (its share went up to 18% in 2016) (Figures 2 and 3). The other border 
crossing points, including those at the border between China and Kazakhstan, currently 
post close to zero freight traffic. 
 
 
1  
The term “ton” refers to metric tons (1,000 kg), unless otherwise specified. 
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As for the commodity structure of that freight traffi it consisted almost completely (93–
99%) of “Other Cargoes” in 2015–2016 (according to the classifi of car- 
goes used in Russian Railways statistical reports). In 2016, however, “Other Cargoes” 
accounted for only half of total freight traffi with “Timber Cargoes” making up the 
balance. 
In terms of short-term and mid-term expansion of export railway container traffic from 
Russia to China, the most high-potential position is FEACN Commodity Group 84 
“Engineering Products” (classified by Russian Railways as “Other Cargoes”). At this time, the 
volume of exports, both in absolute and relative terms, is insignificant, but it may well 
increase as Russian and Chinese machine builders step up their produc- tion cooperation. 
According to Russian foreign trade statistics, the volume of railway-carried Russian imports 
from China, stands at about 2 million tons per year. Approximately one quar- ter of railway 
freight traffic from China to Russia is represented by Engineering Prod- ucts (0.4–0.6 million 
tons per year), while Metal Products and Finished Construction Materials account for 15–20% 
each and Finished Chemical products, Fuel and Mineral and Chemical Raw Materials for 10% 
each. Statistical indicators provided by Russian Railways with respect to import railway 
freight traffic from China to Russia are ap- proximately twice as high, as they include 
multimodal traffic which involves railway transport and tare weight. 
According to Russian Railways statistics, import railway container traffic from China to 
Russia has amounted to 200–250,000 TEU per year, over the last several years. 
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Figure 3. 
Structure of Export 
Railway Container 
Traffic from Rus- 
sia to China with 
a Breakdown 
by Border Crossing 
Points in 2016 
 
Source: 
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The bulk of railway container traffi   originating from China is transhipped through seaports 
(multimodal deliveries). Only about 1/4 of total import container traffi (55,000 TEU in 
2016) passes crossing points at the border with China. Almost all import railway container traffi   
from China (like China-bound traffi crosses the land bor- 
der with China at Zabaykalsk (90–98%) and Dostyk (in 2016, its share went up to 9%) 
(Figures 4 and 5). Freight traffi   through other border crossing points is currently 
minimal. In terms of commodity structure, “Other Cargoes” (according to the Russian 
Railways classifi account for 95% of total freight traffi with a small fraction 
(about 1,000 TEU per year) attributable to “Mineral and Construction Cargoes”. 
It is quite possible that the growing share of container cargoes in the structure of rail- way-
carried imports from China to Russia (which, according to Russian Railways sta- tistics, has 
reached 60% over the last several years) will increase even further (by way of example, 100% 
of cargoes imported by Germany from China are delivered in con- tainers), especially with 
respect to “Other Cargoes”, almost all of which can be con- tainerised. The relatively small 
import railway container traffic from China (which significantly decreased in 2015–2016) 
could exhibit manifold mid-term growth. 
The volume of railway-carried Kazakhstani exports to China (as reported by KTZ) con- tinues 
to grow as transport capacity at the Kazakhstan–China border crossing points (Dostyk–
Alashankou  and  Altynkol–Khorgos)  increases.  It  is  currently  estimated at almost 4.7 
million tons per year. The commodity structure of export freight traffi is dominated by 
Mineral Raw Materials (Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Metal Ores), Metal Products 
(Ferrochrome), Fuel (LNG) and Agricultural Raw Materials (Grain). The share of container 
cargoes (which consist mostly of Ferrous Alloys and Non-Ferrous Met- als) in Kazakhstani 
railway freight traffi   to China is about 15%. Due to the advan- tageous geographical 
position of Kazakhstan (compared to competing countries), 
10% 
2% 
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which is eminently suitable for expansion of China-bound deliveries of Ferrous Al- loys 
(specifically, Ferrochrome), a product eagerly sought by Chinese metallurgical plants, 
combined with the increasing transport capacity of the railway connecting the two 
countries, this freight traffic can be expected to continue to grow, boost- ing the share of 
container cargoes in Kazakhstani railway-carried exports to China. 
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The limited export capacity of Kazakhstani processing industries (Machine Engi- 
neering, Chemical Industry, etc.), the segment which generates the most contain- erised 
exports in developed countries, precludes any significant mid-term increase of related railway 
container traffic from Kazakhstan to China. 
Over the last several years, Kazakhstani import railway freight traffic from China (like 
Kazakhstani imports in general) has decreased, falling below 1.5 million tons in 2016. This 
can be attributed to the decline of demand for imported products in Kazakh- stan, driven 
by a significant reduction of global prices for and export revenues from, the countryʼs key 
export commodities. In terms of commodity structure, Engineering Products, Metal Products 
and Finished Chemical Products are currently the largest Kazakhstani railway-carried 
imports from China, while the share of Petroleum Prod- ucts is declining. Stabilisation in 
global energy and raw materials markets is likely to trigger recovery of imports to 
Kazakhstan of Engineering Products and Household Appliances, goods which are mostly 
delivered from China in railway containers. 
An analysis of foreign trade and transport statistics published by the EU, the EAEU and Belarus 
shows that almost 100% of Belarusian exports to China are carried by mul- timodal 
(railway/maritime) transport through the Baltic States and Baltic Sea ports (1–2 million 
tons per year). The key export items are Mineral Fertilisers and Round Timber; accordingly, 
the share of container cargoes (represented mostly by Finished Chemical Products and 
Engineering Products) is insignificant (1–2%). The volume of Belarusian transit export 
cargoes carried to China by Russian and Kazakhstani rail- ways is still quite modest (according 
to Russian Railways statistics, about 2–8,000 tons per year), with supplies made up exclusively 
of “Other Cargoes”, which are becoming increasingly containerised (more than 80% in 
2016). 
Belarusian imports from China are also carried by  multimodal  (railway/mari- time and 
road/maritime) transport through the Baltic States and Baltic Sea ports. According to 
Russian Railways statistics, Belarusian import railway freight traffic from China 
transiting through Russia and Kazakhstan considerably increased to ex- ceed 60,000 tons, or 
10% of total Belarusian imports from the PRC in 2016. Structu- rally, it is dominated by 
containerised “Other Cargoes” (85%). 
The volume of railway-carried Kyrgyzstani exports to China is currently insignificant (Coal, 
Precious Metals) and pending implementation of a project to establish direct railway service 
between the two countries, it is restricted by the limited transport ca- pacity of Kazakhstanʼs 
transit railway routes using the border crossing points Dostyk– Alashankou and Altynkol–
Khorgos. Kyrgyzstani railway-carried imports from China are also insignificant at less than 
100,000 tons per year. Key import items include Engineering Products, Metal Products and 
Finished Chemical Products. 
According to Russian Railways statistics, railway transport (with transit through 
Russia/Kazakhstan) is currently not used to support export or import shipments between 
Armenia and China. 
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1.2. PRC–EU Freight Traffic 
The more than twofold increase in the volume of export railway freight traffi from EU countries 
to China (from 190,000 tons in 2007 to almost 400,000 tons in 2016) is pri- marily 
attributable to a manifold growth of railway deliveries from Europe2 to China (via Russia and 
Kazakhstan) of Passenger Motor Vehicles and Components as well as certain types of 
Engineering Products (engine parts, transmissions, pumps, etc.) (Attachment 1). The share of 
Engineering Products reached half of the total exports in 2016. Approximately 15–20% of 
European railway-carried exports to China are rep- resented by Metals and Metal Products 
(which posted a more than twofold growth, reaching almost 70,000 tons). Other notable 
export items include Finished Chemical Products (about 10%) and Forestry Products (Pulp 
and Paper and Timber, accounting for approximately 5–8% each) (Figure 6). An analysis of 
Russian Railways statistical data shows that virtually all railway-carried cargoes transported 
from the EU to China (transit using the Russian Railways railway network) are containerised. 
In the commodity structure of railway-carried EU imports from China in recent years, 
Machinery, Equipment, Industrial Products account for about 55% and Metal Products for 10–
15% (with the share declining). Mineral and Chemical Raw Materials, Finished Chemical 
Products, Finished Construction Materials, Clothing, Footwear and Textiles each account for 
5–10%, while the shares of the remaining product groups are consid- erably less (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. 
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The current high rate of containerisation of mutual trade and freight traffic between the EU 
and China (80%) is attributable primarily to maritime trade, as 98% of all car- goes are 
carried by ship. 
Russian Railways statistics on transit railway container traffic from the EU to China 
(expressed in TEU) indicate an “explosive” growth from 1,300 TEU in 2010, to more than 
50,000 TEU in 2016. While prior to 2014, virtually all transit railway container traffic from 
the EU to China went through Zabaykalsk (95–100%), the share of that crossing point 
decreased to 22% in 2016, with 2/3 of containers (about 34,000 TEU) transported through 
Dostyk and another 10% through Naushki (Figures 8 and 9). In terms of freight traffic 
structure, more than 95% of transit railway container car- goes transported from the EU to 
China are classified under “Other Cargoes”. 
Between 2010–2016, reverse transit container traffic (from China to the EU) in- creased 
from 5,600 TEU to almost 100,000 TEU and is now almost two times higher than export 
container traffic from the EU to China. Distribution of that freight traffic by border crossing 
points is similar to that registered for EU–China freight traffic: the share of border 
crossing point Dostyk has increased from 1% to 67%, the share of Zabaykalsk has 
decreased from 99% to 20% (with the absolute volume of container traffic through that 
crossing point up almost 3.5-fold) and there has been a rapid growth of freight traffic 
through Naushki (8% in 2016) and Altynkol (5%) (Figures 10 and 11). Virtually all freight 
traffic (99%) consists of “Other Cargoes”. 
The commodity structure of mutual trade between EU countries and China (dominat- ed by 
container cargoes and containerisable cargoes, including those capable of being switched 
from maritime transport to railway transport) creates good prospects for considerable 
growth of transit railway container traffic (EU–China) through the terri- tory of EAEU 
member states (Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus)—using their transport networks and 
logistical infrastructure. 
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Figure 10. 
Changes in Transit 
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a Breakdown 
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1.3. Methodological Approach to Selecting Container Cargoes 
Switchable to Railway Transport 
The methodological approach developed in our research based on analysis of the 
commodity structure of foreign trade freight traffic, makes it possible to identify the 
potential volume and structure of cargoes that could be switched from maritime transport to 
railway transport. 
Technically, most cargoes (with the exception of oversized, self-propelled and towed 
machines, such as those used for mining, road construction, railway machinery, bus- es and 
lorries) can be transported in containers. Moreover, such machines can be transported in 
containers in the form of knock-down kits. However, it is inexpedient to transport many 
inexpensive, high-tonnage cargoes in containers from the view- point of the economic 
viability of transport and logistic operations and, although there are “containerised” 
exceptions, most such cargoes are not, nor will they ever be, transported in containers 
(Table 1). Such commodity groups may include certain expensive low-tonnage cargoes that 
are de facto transported in containers (e.g. lubri- cant oils in retail packages classified under 
“Fuel”), but their share in the total volume of international freight traffic is negligible and can 
be left out of the equation. 
 
 
 
 
10 Cereals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Fuel 
Table 1. 
Cargoes Not Suit- 
able for Container 
Transport 
 
Source: 
in-house estimates 
based on Eurostat 
data and foreign 
trade analyses 
 
 
29 Organic Chemical Raw Materials 
 
 
4403 Round Timber 
 
 
68 Construction Stone 
 
 
7302, 7303, 7304, 7305, 7306 Rails and Pipes 
 
 
8601, 8602, 8603, 8604, 8605, 8606 Locomotives and Railway Cars 
 
 
88 Aviation Equipment 
 
 
89 Vessels 
8701, 8702, 8704, 8705 Tractors, Buses, Trucks and Special Motor Vehicles 
8429, 8430 Mining and Road Construction Machines 
72 (excluding 7202) Ferrous Metals (Excluding Ferrous Alloys) 
for the Russian Federation and Emerging 
Countries—4401, 4402, 4403, 4406, 4407 
Round Timber and Sawn Timber 
31 Mineral  Fertilisers 
28 Inorganic Chemical Raw Materials 
23 (excluding 2309) 
25 
Food Industry Waste (Excluding Animal Feed) 
Non-Metallic Raw Materials, Cement 
FEACN Commodity Group Cargo 
26 Ores 
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In the future, containers may well be used to transport cargoes from certain commod- ity 
groups for which this mode of transport is currently not the first choice. Such situ- ations may 
emerge in the event of a significant rise in global prices for a considerable part of the products 
comprising such groups (e.g. for Alloy Steel Products classified under Group 72, Ferrous 
Metals). Moreover, for certain idiosyncratic reasons, inex- pensive “non-containerisable” 
high-tonnage cargoes are, in fact, being transported in containers along some 
transcontinental routes. Thus, almost 100% of Germany- bound Chinese cargoes (including 
Construction Stone, Ores, Non-Metallic Raw Ma- terials, Fuel and other similar goods) are 
transported in containers. This is large- ly attributable to the domination, both in Chinese 
and German ports, of container transhipment technologies that do not involve either 
loading or unloading of solid or liquid bulk cargoes. 
Almost all international cargoes (with the exception of those classified under the 18 
commodity groups listed above) are containerisable. 
For a number of objective and subjective reasons, most freight traffic between Eu- ropean 
countries and the APR is currently by maritime transport, with most cargoes carried in both 
directions in containers. For some of these cargoes, particularly those with high unit value 
(value per unit of mass), one of the critical competitive factors is delivery time and it is 
technically impossible to reduce that time if maritime trans- port is used. Accordingly, for 
those cargoes it is reasonable to use the much faster railway delivery (through Russia and 
EAEU member states). A comprehensive analy- sis of the commodity structure of Eurasian 
freight traffic between critical country pairs, subject to unit values and physical volumes of 
international cargoes classified under 2-digit/4-digit HS/FEACN codes, has yielded a list of 
cargoes that are relevant (attractive) for the switch (reorientation) from maritime transport 
to railway trans- port (Table 2). 
Based on customs value per unit of mass (estimated to be in excess of $10 per kg), 
consumer properties of the product (cargo) and technical aspects of its prepack- ing, 
packaging, transport and logistics, Engineering Products (with the exception of oversized 
machines not suitable for container transport) and Consumer Goods (Clothing, Footwear, 
etc.) are the leading product groups for which transit deliv- ery (through Russia and 
other EAEU member states) by railway is optimal. Other product groups that might be 
switched from maritime transport to railway trans- port include Pharmaceutical Products, 
Perfumery and Cosmetics, Toys and Sports Equipment and Works of Art. In addition, based 
on their value metrics and technical parameters related to carriage by railway transport 
(in containers), certain Non- Ferrous Metals (in particular, expensive Nickel Products) 
may also be effi transported in containers. 
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30 Pharmaceutical Products 
 
 
42 Leather 
 
43 Fur 
 
50 Silk 
Table 2. 
Containerisable 
Cargoes that 
Could be Switched 
to Railway Trans- 
port 
 
Source: 
in-house estimates 
based on Eurostat 
data 
 
61 Knitted  Goods 
 
 
64 Footwear 
 
 
75 Nickel 
 
 
85 Electric Equipment and Radio Electronic Devices 
 
 
91 Watches 
 
 
97 Works of Art 
 
 
1.4. Main Factors Shaping Distribution of Freight Traffic 
among Modes of Transport 
There are three groups of factors which may affect distribution of freight traffic 
among various modes of transport. 
 
Characteristics of Transported Cargoes 
Physical state of the cargo (solid, liquid, gaseous), cargo properties (bulk, perishable, fl
 hazardous, etc.) and packaging dimensions. For example, liquid cargoes are 
generally not suitable for container transport (with the exception of tank con- tainers), but 
if prepacked they may become containerisable (motor lubricant oils, white spirit and 
similar products). 
Cargo tonnage: high, medium and low-tonnage cargoes. This factor directly affects the 
choice of the mode of transport. The absence of high-tonnage cargoes in the trade 
between the EU and China (with the exception of Swedish Iron Ore, Scandina- vian Timber 
and French Grain) means that it is possible to almost completely con- tainerise mutual 
freight traffi 
95 Toys and Sports Equipment 
90 Tools 
84 (excluding 8429, 8430) Engineering Products 
65 Headwear 
62 Clothing 
FEACN Commodity Group Cargo 
33 Perfumery and Cosmetics 
51 Wool 
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Cargo price: an integral, “synthetic” indicator which determines the economic vi- ability 
of a particular mode of transport (Table 3). In addition to the factors dis- cussed above, 
such as the type of cargo and related volume and physical properties (including physical 
state and packaging), the price of transported cargo directly af- fects selection of the mode 
of transport to be used along EAEU–China, EU–China and EAEU–EU routes. The price, 
being the integral (universal) indicator describing the product or cargo, determines to a 
certain extent, the very possibility of economi- cally viable and effi  use of a certain type 
and mode of transport. Methodologi- cally, the link between the price of the transported 
cargo and selection of the mode of transport relies on the share of the transport 
component in the ultimate price of the cargo (as perceived by the consumer) vis-à-vis 
other inherent economic fac- tors (such as losses from cargo being delayed on the way, cost 
of maintaining storage facilities to secure a suffi          stock of raw materials and fi
 products, etc.). 
 
Geographical Position of Counterparties 
The geographical position of the relevant regions is another important factor which affects 
selection of certain modes of transport for freight along the China–EAEU–EU axis. Large 
distances between countries and regions along that axis predetermine ex- tensive use of 
maritime, railway and aviation transport, limited use of road transport and minimal use of 
inland water transport. 
• The maritime route through the Suez Canal is currently the main route for freight traffic 
between the EU and the PRC. In the future, the Northern Sea Route may put up some 
competition, but even with global warming, it may be regarded only as an auxiliary 
option. At the same time, development of continental railway sys- tems (primarily in 
EAEU member states and China) improvement and alignment of freight rate policies in 
stakeholder countries, development of transport and lo- gistical infrastructure 
(debottlenecking), active marketing in EU member states and China to attract industrial 
clients to EAEU transit transport networks, are all measures that can encourage a switch 
of an increasing share of freight traffic from maritime transport to railway transport. 
• Freight traffi between EAEU member states and China is set to use maritime 
transport (in its multimodal railway/maritime version), railway transport and road 
transport (to service cross-border trade). In EAEU–China trade, multimod- al 
railway/maritime transport maintains a competitive edge vs. direct railway transport 
because in Russia, production and consumption potential is concen- trated in the 
European part of the country and in Kazakhstan in the north and northwest. 
• The main modes of transport serving EAEU–EU freight traffic are railway trans- port, 
road transport and maritime transport (in its multimodal railway/maritime and 
road/maritime versions). Due to the relative geographic proximity of EU coun- tries, 
Belarus and the European part of Russia, the use of road transport to carry container 
cargoes between the EAEU and the EU remains economically viable. 
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Parameters of Various Modes of Transport 
Another equally important group of factors affecting selection of a given mode of trans- port for 
various types of cargoes comprises economic, organisational and technological parameters of 
various modes of transport in the context of the shipping process: cost, weight, speed 
(timeframe), regularity (rhythmicity), reliability (guaranteed on-sched- ule delivery and cargo 
preservation) and ability to deliver the cargo to any destination (Table 3). 
The following sections provide a comparative analysis of the impact that those factors have on 
the volume, commodity structure and value parameters of freight traffi and an assessment of 
the elasticity of demand for transport services subject to these fac- tors’ operation. 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
Interrelation of Fac- 
tors Affecting Se- 
lection of Maritime/ 
Railway Transport 
to Carry Container 
Cargoes and Best 
Option for the 
Consignor Subject 
to Economic Condi- 
tions in 2016 
 
Source: 
in-house estimates 
 
 
Note: favourable factors are shown in green, less favourable in yellow and unfavourable in red. 
* Subsidisation of railway freight traffic in the PRC will be discussed in Section 2. 
 
more than 
45 days 
 
25 journeys 
per week 
 
 
 
 
33 journeys 
per week 
 
up to 1 day 
 
 
 
up to 18 days 
 
 
 
according 
to schedule 
 
Mode 
of Transport 
 
Through 
Freight Rate 
 
Delivery Time  
Delivery 
Regularity 
 
Delivery 
Precision 
 
Maritime 
(Multimodal) 
 
 
 
 
Railway 
 
$2,500 per FEU 
 
 
$5,500 per FEU 
(including 
PRC subsidies)* 
 
$9,000 per FEU 
(excluding 
PRC subsidies)* 
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2. Assessment of Freight Rate Elasticity 
of Demand for Container Freight Services: 
Impact of Cost on Freight Traffic 
 
2.1. Maritime Container Freight Rates 
and Their Impact on Land Freight Traffic 
A review of changes in maritime container freight rates used on Asia–Europe routes 
(Shanghai–Northern Europe and Shanghai-Mediterranean) shows their considerable volatility 
in 2009–2017 as part of a long-term downward trend. From 2009 to 2016, freight rates 
decreased almost twofold from $2,600 per FEU ($1,400 per TEU)3 to less than $1,400 per 
FEU ($770 per TEU), to climb back up to $1,800 per FEU by the middle of 2017. The relevant 
indices moved in a haphazard fashion, posting annual increase/ decrease rates of 30–50% 
(Attachment 2, Table A2.3). 
The volume of container traffic between the EU and China in 2009–2016 was gene- rally 
stable at 5–6.5 million FEU (10–30 million TEU) per year, displaying an overall growth 
trend (31% over eight years). During some years in that period, the volume of container 
traffic decreased, by 8% in 2012, by 2% in 2013 and by 4% in 2015. 
The relationship between the volume of container traffic and maritime container freight 
rates is illustrated below (Figure 12): 
• In 2010, as the SCFI4 Shanghai–Northern Europe and the SCFI Shanghai–Medi- 
terranean posted a year-on-year increase of 28% and 24% respectively, container traffic 
between the APR and the EU went up by 21%. 
• In 2011, when the indices dropped by 51% and 44% respectively, container traffic 
continued to grow (+6%). 
• In 2012, when the Shanghai Shipping Exchange indices recovered and increased by 54% and 
37% respectively, container traffi  between the APR and the EU went down by 8%. 
• In 2013, container traffic continued to decline (–2%) against the backdrop of a new 
decrease in index values by 20% and 14%, respectively. 
• In 2014, when the Shanghai Shipping Exchange indices posted insignificant growth (by 
7% and 9%, respectively), container traffic increased by 13%. 
• In 2015, a new collapse of freight quotes by 46% and 41%, respectively, provoked a 
decrease of container traffic by 4%. 
• in 2016, when the Shanghai Shipping Exchange indices showed differentiated growth (+ 
23% for the SCFI Shanghai–Northern Europe and +4% for the SCFI Shang- hai–
Mediterranean), container traffi  between the APR and the EU increased by 5%. 
 
 
3  
Here and in the following sections, 1 FEU is assumed to be approximately equal to 2 TEU. 
4  
Shanghai Containerised Freight Index. 
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Figure 12. 
Changes in Freight 
Indices and Volume 
of Container Traffic 
along APR–Europe 
Routes 
 
Sources: 
Eurostat, Shanghai 
Shipping Exchange 
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As we can see, changes in container traffi did not correlate with changes in maritime container 
freight rates. Reduction of freight rates did not spur container traffi while their growth and high 
level did not depress it. We may conclude that demand for maritime container freight services 
(regardless of the type of cargo) is inelastic vis-à-vis freight rates. The situation is as follows: 
shipping companies are frequently forced to reduce con- tainer freight rates to below cost to 
maintain their schedules. In the opinion of industry experts, over the last several years there has 
been an increase in excessive tonnage in the container freight segment of the maritime freight 
market, which led in August 2016, to the bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd. (South 
Korea), one of the world’s largest shipping companies. 
On APR (China)–Europe routes, the situation is further exacerbated by the imbalance in 
container trade between the EU and China. The volume of container cargoes deliv- ered from 
China to the EU in recent years is approximately 80% higher than the volume moving in the 
reverse direction. According to Eurostat, over the last several years, the share of empty 
containers in freight traffi from the EU to China stands at about 35–40% (in 2007–2008, it 
exceeded 50%) vs. 1–3% in freight traffi from China to the EU. Return containers sent from EU 
countries to China are often fi  with cargoes that are normally not containerised, such as Timber or 
Waste Paper. 
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It should be noted that, as a rule, seaports do not act as major “generators” of export and 
import freight traffic, or as starting and finishing points of their origin or destina- tion. 
Accordingly, to make a correct comparison of freight costs incurred when using different 
modes of transport to carry cargoes between China and Europe, it is neces- sary to take into 
consideration the freight rates charged for delivery of containers to and from ports by 
railway, road, or inland waterway, as well as the cost of tranship- ment of cargoes in ports. 
Those additional container freight costs constitute a sig- nificant part of the “through” cost 
of delivery of cargoes from China to the EU and from the EU to China. It would be 
reasonable to select Chongqing, one of the largest industrial cities in Central China (whose 
administration was the first to start subsi- dising freight rates), as the point of origin of 
container traffic in China and Duisburg, North Rhine–Westphalia, a major German industrial 
centre, as its point of destina- tion. China Railways Container Transport Co. Ltd (CRCT) 
has selected this direction to map the largest number of regular container train routes, 
setting an extremely busy schedule: 16–17 trains per week from Chongqing to Duisburg 
and 7 trains per week from Duisburg to Chongqing (Attachment 2, Table A2.6). 
 
2.2. Railway Container Freight Rates 
and Their Impact on Freight Traffic 
Currently all active railway routes that connect China with EU countries (according to the 
schedule published by CRCT) pass through EAEU member states. 
There is no uniform through freight rate along their length. Each railway company 
operating the transcontinental route uses its own freight rates. Currently freight rate changes 
made by railway operators are not synchronised. In addition, one of the im- portant 
components of the through freight rate is the cost of maintenance of rolling stock (container 
cars) which may be owned by the consignor or the railway company, be used under lease, etc. 
Therefore, no single railway company can change its freight rates so as to dramati- cally 
affect the aggregate ultimate amount of freight costs without going beyond its profitability 
range. Two possible options are agreed synchronous reduction of freight rates by all 
stakeholders, or provision by the State of preferences (within the frame- work of an 
international railway freight traffic promotion policy) enabling the na- tional carrier to 
drastically reduce its freight rates. 
Railway container traffic between the PRC and Europe acquired a commercial and regular 
nature only in 2014. Prior to that, it was limited to one-off deliveries without any attempt to 
gain any direct economic effect or to fill up the return containers. Vibrant growth of the 
volume of railway container traffic between China and the EU started when the Chinese 
regional government subsidies began. Subsidy of railway container traffic by regional 
Chinese authorities is the main factor responsible for the growth of railway traffic between the 
PRC and Europe. 
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Henan–EU 
Zhengzhou–Hamburg 
(Germany) 
10,245 16–18 2013 10,500 
3,000– 
7,000 
5,500 
 
Subsidisation of Railway Container Traffic 
along the PRC–EAEU–EU Axis by Chinese Authorities 
Analysis of the few available sources of information shows that Chinese authorities are 
currently using a decentralised system to subsidise railway container traffic. Sub- sidies are 
provided only by administrations of the relevant provinces and municipali- ties subordinated 
to the central government and only with respect to transcontinen- tal railway routes (port-
bound traffic is not subsidised). The level of subsidisation can vary significantly from 
region to region. Furthermore, Chinese authorities do not subsidise container traffic from 
Europe to China. As a result, European consignors are less inclined to use railway containers 
to carry cargoes to China (HSBC, 2016). 
Subsidisation of railway container traffic is restricted to provinces and cities of Cen- tral 
China (Chongqing, Sichuan, Hubei, Henan) for geographical reasons (great dis- tance to 
seaports and relatively smaller distance to Europe by land). These Chinese regions are 
currently experiencing the most dynamic growth and generating new in- ternational railway 
container traffic. The number of container trains is rapidly grow- ing and most routes start 
and finish here. 
As noted by Brinza (2017), the average amount of subsidies varies from region to re- gion 
and lies within the range of $3,500–4,000 per FEU, while the standard freight rate charged 
for transporting a container from China to Europe is about $9,000; thus the subsidy lowers it 
to $5,000. A similar estimate is provided by Moss (2017): about 
$5,000 for transporting a container by railway from Chengdu to Hamburg. These fig- ures 
correlate with the systematised information presented by Besharati et al. (2017). Generally, 
regional subsidies vary from $1,500 to $7,000 per FEU (Table 4). In fact, the subsidies make it 
possible to reduce the freight rate for transporting cargoes on Chi- nese territory to zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 
EU-Bound Contai- 
ner Traffic Sub- 
sidies Provided 
by Regional Chi- 
nese Authorities, 
Effective Years and 
Average Subsidised 
Through Freight 
Rates 
 
Source: 
in-house estimates 
 
 
 
Chongqing–Duisburg 
(Germany) 11,000 15–17 2011 
8,000– 
9,000 
3,500– 
4,000 4,750 
 
 
Chengdu–Łódź 
(Poland) 
9,965 12–14 2013 
8,500– 
10,290 
3,000– 
3,500 6,150 
 
 
Jiangsu–EU Suzhou–Warsaw 
(Poland) 
11,200
 
 
12–15 
 
2014 
 
7,500 
 
1,500 
 
6,000 
Zhejiang–EU Yiwu–Mad rid (Spain) 13,052 21 2014 10,000 5,500 4,500 
Hubei–EU 
Wuhan–Czech 
Republic, Poland 
10,700 15–17 2014 12,000 
4,000– 
5,000 
7,500 
Subsidising 
Chinese 
Administration 
(Direction) 
Route 
Through 
Distance, 
Transit 
Effective Freight 
km 
Time, 
Year  Rate, 
days  
$ per FEU 
Average 
Subsidy Subsidised 
Amount,  Freight 
$ per FEU Rate, 
$ per FEU 
Chongqing–EU 
Sichuan–EU 
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According to our estimates, total subsidies provided by Chinese authorities in 2016 
amounted to about $88 million. This estimate assumes an average container transport subsidy 
of $2,500 per FEU, with the total number of subsidised containers originating from central 
PRC provinces standing at 35,000 FEU. Accordingly, an average subsidy per FEU has been 
merely 0.3–0.4% of the total value of container-shipped cargoes. 
It is probable that China will discontinue or reduce subsidies for freight traffi af- ter 
2020. This may happen due to the growing demand for container traffi from the PRC to 
the  EU, as  Chinese  consignors  enjoy  additional  advantages  offered by railway routes 
(in comparison with sea routes): convenience (speed, frequency and regularity, door-to-
door delivery, etc.) is expected to compensate for the freight rate disparity. 
The subsidisation policy pursued by the authorities of a number of Chinese provinces certainly 
changes the economics of international railway container traffi fundamen- tally, distorting the 
ratio of actual transport costs and freight rates. It is not quite cor- rect to compare changes in the 
volume of railway container traffi along China–Europe routes with changes in the subsidised 
through freight rate charged for container deliv- ery. However, the actual reduction of the freight 
rate makes transporting a broad range of goods from China to Europe by railway containers a 
commercially viable proposi- tion, which encourages consignors to switch from sea routes to 
railways. Incidentally, the signifi increased frequency (regularity) of departure of 
container trains from China to Europe and back (which is an order of magnitude higher than 
for maritime transport) has already become a new “non-tariff” factor of attraction for 
consignors. It should also be noted that the continuously expanding geography of railway 
contai- ner routes gives this mode of transport a certain competitive edge in terms of door- 
to-door delivery compared to sea routes, which almost always imply the need to use 
multimodal transport and tranship the cargo before it can reach the end consumer. 
 
Assessment of the Relationship between Demand for 
Container Traffic and Freight Rate 
In theory, there should be an inverse relationship between the freight rate and the 
volume of freight traffic. Any reduction of costs should significantly increase the 
competitiveness of the land route and attract consignors. 
But in reality, the relationship between the volume of container traffic and transport costs 
functions differently. This is largely attributable to the use of non-market pric- ing practices 
(subsidy of freight rates by Chinese authorities), the relatively short his- tory of commercial 
operation of land routes between China and Europe, the absence of reciprocal China-bound 
export flows from the EU and the EAEU and a number of other factors. Let us take an in-
depth look at the situation with freight traffic along the PRC–EAEU–EU axis and container 
freight rates. 
The annual doubling of the number of container trains and of the volume of contai- nerised 
cargoes along PRC–EAEU–EU routes in 2013–2016, was largely attributable to freight rate 
changes in the PRC and to the possibility of quickly switching freight traffic from sea routes 
to railway transport, with its considerable advantages: 
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• 2011: The administration of the City of Chongqing begins to offer local manu- 
facturers engaged in export railway container traffic subsidies in the amount of 
$3,500–4,000 per FEU (40–50% of the Chongqing–Duisburg through freight rate). 
Container trains start to depart regularly from Chongqing for Duisburg with a frequency 
of 1–2 trains per month in 2011, up to 16–17 trains per week in 2018 (Attachment 2, 
Table A2.6). 
• 2013: The administration of Sichuan Province (City of Chengdu) begins to sub- sidise 
export railway container freight rates to the tune of $3,000–3,500 per FEU (30–40% of 
the Chengdu–Łódź through freight rate). Container trains start to de- part regularly from 
Chengdu for Łódź with a continuously increasing frequency, reaching 21–22 trains per 
week in 2018 (Attachment 2, Table A2.6). 
These two commonly used routes allow us to assess the threshold competitive level of the 
China–Europe through freight rate compared to the multimodal option (maritime– railway route 
between China and Europe). 
Calculations based on the data presented in Table 4 show that the through freight rate for 
multimodal (railway–deep sea–railway) shipping of a 40-foot container along the 
Chongqing–Shenzhen–Hamburg–Duisburg route can be estimated at about $3,200: 
• Chongqing–Shenzhen (railway, 1,500 km)—$900 ($0.60 per km); 
• Shenzhen–Hamburg (deep sea, 18,500 km)—$1,500 ($0.05 per km); 
• Hamburg–Duisburg (railway, 400 km)—$800 ($2 per km). 
The cost of shipping a 40-foot container by container train along the Chongqing– 
Duisburg route can be estimated at $8,000–9,000 per FEU without subsidies, while the 
subsidised freight rate is about $4,800 ($4,000–5,500) per FEU. 
Another example: The average through freight rate for multimodal (railway–deep sea–
railway) shipping of a 40-foot container along the Chengdu–Shenzhen–Gdańsk– Łódź route is 
$2,900: 
• Chengdu–Shenzhen (railway, 1,800 km)—$1,100 ($0.60 per km); 
• Shenzhen–Gdańsk (deep sea, 19,100 km)—$1,500 ($0.05 per km); 
• Gdańsk–Łódź (railway, 300 km)—$300 ($1 per km). 
The cost of shipping a 40-foot container by container train along the Chengdu– Łódź 
route can be estimated at $8,500–10,200 per FEU without subsidies, while the 
subsidised freight rate is about $6,000 ($5,000–7,300) per FEU. 
Therefore, the growth of  railway  container  traffic  between  China  and  the  EU in 
2011–2017, from 7,000 FEU to 131,000 FEU (or from 14,000 TEU to 262,000 TEU) 
was achieved with a through railway freight rate of $4,800–6,000 per FEU (sub- 
sidised by about 40%) (Table 5). Subsidisation-driven reduction of China–Europe 
railway container freight rates by 30–50%, resulted in a 19-fold growth of contai- ner 
traffic. Accordingly, the average competitive railway freight rate for container traffic 
between China and the EU was: 
 
“deep sea” (multimodal) + $2,500 per FEU ≈ $5,500 per FEU 
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Table 5. 
Changes in Railway 
Container Freight 
Rates and Volume 
of Freight Traffic 
along PRC–Europe 
Routes (Estimated 
Freight Rate Elas- 
ticity of Demand), 
2011–2016 
 
Source: 
CRCT 
 
 
PRC–Europe Container Traffic, 
Thousand FEU 7 14 10 22 40 74  
Average Subsidised PRC–Europe 
Railway Container Freight Rate, 
$ per FEU 
 
9,000 
 
4,750 
 
5,450 
 
5,750 
 
5,750 
 
5,750 
 
 
Data from Table 5 testify to the high elasticity of demand for railway container ship- ping of 
certain cargoes5, depending on freight rate changes. 
According to the plans published by the National Development and Reform Com- mission 
of the PRC, the number of regular container trains running along China– EU routes by 
2020 should triple and reach 5,000 (Binhai New Area, 2017). This will cause container 
traffic to increase to 200–250,000 FEU (400–500,000 TEU). In as much as China does 
not intend to increase subsidisation of railway container traffic, the formula and the value of 
competitive China–EU railway container freight rate will not change much. 
A sevenfold growth of railway container traffic between China and Europe (from 74,000 
FEU in 2016 to 0.5 million FEU) can be achieved if the through freight rate is further 
reduced by 25–30%. This is possible only if all railway operators (KTZ, Rus- sian Railways, 
European railway operators) pursue a uniform freight rate policy and railway container 
freight rate subsidisation by China remains at its current level. Freight rate reduction will 
enable a switch to railway transport of certain types of car- goes which, although suitable for 
this mode of transport, are significantly less expen- sive than those transported at this time. 
We suggest two possible scenarios for development of container traffic along the PRC–
EAEU–EU axis. 
Scenario 1—Further Freight Rate Reduction: Container traffic increases to 0.5 million 
FEU. In this scenario, dependence of demand for railway container freight services on the freight 
rate (along the PRC–Europe route) will be expressed as follows (Figure 13): 
• A through freight rate of about $9,000 per FEU (“deep sea” [multimodal] + $6,500 per 
FEU)—container traffic of less than 1,000 FEU (no commercial container traffic until 
2013). 
• A through freight rate of about $5,500 per FEU (“deep sea” [multimodal] + $2,500 per 
FEU)—container traffic of 74,000 FEU in 2016. 
• A through freight rate of about $5,500 per FEU6 (“deep sea” [multimodal] + $2,500 per 
FEU)—container traffic of 200–250,000 FEU in 2020. 
 
 
5 
According to an analysis of Eurostat statistics, in structural terms, railway container traffic between China and the EU is cur- 
rently dominated by expensive goods with an average price of more than $100 per kg (electronics, computers, luxury cars, 
etc.). 
6 
Provided that global oil prices (and, accordingly, heating oil and diesel fuel prices as the key factors determining the cost 
of sea freight) remain at their current level. 
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• through freight rate of about $4,000 per FEU7  (“deep sea” [multimodal] + $1,000 per 
FEU)—container traffi  of 500,000 FEU (1,000,000 TEU) in 2030 (Think Railways, 2016). The 
current through freight rate (including subsidies) of $5,500 per FEU has already 
made it possible to increase container traffic from virtually zero to 74,000 FEU in 2016 and 
may spur further growth of container traffic to 200–250,000 FEU in 2020. After that, 
keeping the freight rate at $5,500 per FEU will no longer produce such a pro- nounced 
effect and container traffic growth rates will dramatically slow down. This means that a 
container traffic increase from 200–250,000 FEU in 2020 to 0.5 mil- lion FEU by 2030 is 
possible, subject to further reduction of the through freight rate by $1,500 per FEU (from 
$5,500 per FEU to $4,000 per FEU). 
Scenario 2 can be described as “inertial”: retention of the current through freight rate 
(including Chinese subsidies) at the current level of $5,500 per FEU after 2020. In this 
scenario, dependence of demand for railway container freight services on the freight rate 
(along the PRC–Europe route) will be expressed as follows (Figure 14): 
• A through freight rate of about $9,000 per FEU (“deep sea” [multimodal] + $6,500 per 
FEU)—container traffic of less than 1,000 FEU (no commercial container traffic until 
2013). 
 
 
7  
Provided that global oil prices remain at their current level. 
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Figure 14. 
Scenario 2— 
No Freight Rate 
Change. Railway 
Container Freight 
Rates and Volume 
of Freight Traffic 
along PRC–Europe 
Routes (Estimated 
Freight Rate Elas- 
ticity of Demand), 
2011–2030 
 
Source: 
in-house estimates 
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• A through freight rate of about $5,500 per FEU (“deep sea” [multimodal] + $2,500 per 
FEU)—container traffic of 74,000 FEU in 2016. 
• A through freight rate of about $5,500 per FEU8 (“deep sea” [multimodal] + $2,500 per 
FEU)—container traffic of 200–250,000 FEU in 2020 and subsequent reduction of freight 
traffic growth rate. 
An analysis of available data shows that each new reduction of the railway freight rate 
(closing the gap with the multimodal freight rate) enables transition to railway transport of 
additional switchable cargoes and accordingly, brings additional con- signors and 
generates additional freight volumes. 
As noted above, there is a threshold through railway freight rate that enables the launch of an 
economically viable railway container freight service between China and Europe (about $0.60 
per km, or an average of $6,000–7,000 for the entire route). Limited reduc- tion of the through 
freight rate, e.g. by $1,000 per FEU (from $9,000 per FEU to $8,000 per FEU) in 2011, would 
not have any impact on generation of container traffi 
It should also be noted that there is currently no data on the actual correlation between freight 
rate changes and the volume of railway container freight traffi as massive de- partures of 
container trains from China to Europe only started in 2014 and the freight rates charged on 
subsidised routes (subsidy amounts) have not yet been adjusted. 
 
 
8  
Provided that global oil prices (and, accordingly, heating oil and diesel fuel prices as the key factors determining the cost 
of sea freight) remain at their current level. 
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3. “Convenience” Elasticity of Demand 
for Container Freight Services: Impact 
of Speed and Regularity on Freight Traffic 
 
The speed and regularity of freight traffi as well as shipping costs (freight rates) and cargo 
type, are some of the most important factors affecting the attractiveness of vari- ous modes of 
transport. 
China’s active stance in implementing the BRI is expressed, among other ways, by its effort to 
stimulate development of railway container traffi between the PRC and Eu- rope and by 
organising regular container train routes. According to CRCT, between 2011–2013 the 
number of container trains, despite fast growth, was measured in doz- ens. However, the 
volume of container traffi did not exceed 3,500 FEU per year and regular trains only ran from 
China to Europe. In 2014–2016, there was a sharp increase in the number of regular routes (21 in 
2015, 52 in 2016), number of container trains and volume of container traffi  (Table 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 
Volume of Contai- 
ner Traffic Carried 
by Regular China– 
Europe Container 
Trains, 2011–2017 
 
Source: 
CRCT 
 
 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
from to from to from to 
China China China China  China  China 
from to 
China China 
from 
China 
to from  to 
China China China 
from 
China 
to 
China 
Container 
Trains, Units 17 0 42 0 80 0 280 28 550 265 1130 572 2,399 1,274 
 
Container 
Traffic, FEU 
 
702 
 
0 
 
1,837 
 
0 
 
3,480 
 
0 
 
11,902 
 
1,133 
 
23,566 
 
10,885 
 
48,700 
 
4,197 
 
106,000 
 
52,965 
Average 
Trainload, 
FEU 
 
41 44 - 44 - 43 40 43 41 43 28 44 42 
 
 
 
There remains a significant imbalance between railway container traffic from China to 
Europe and from Europe to China. According to CRCT, there were 44 regular routes from 
China to Europe by the end of 2017 and the total number of container trains was 2,400 
(106,000 FEU), while the number of regular routes from Europe to China was only 17 and 
while the number of container trains was 1,300 (53,000 FEU). Germany is the main 
counterparty of China in Europe. About 60% of all container trains run- ning along China–
Europe routes run between China and Germany. 
Most routes are used 2–4 times per week and in some cases the frequency of train runs is 
much higher. Routes linking the continental centres of Europe and Central China are 
classified as priority routes. For example, the Duisburg–Chongqing route 
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is run by container trains (in both directions) 23–24 times per week, the Chengdu– 
Łódź/Nuremberg/Tilburg route 31–32 times per week. In other words, even today, owing 
to the efforts exerted by CRCT and other railway operators (KTZ, Russian Rail- ways and 
European railway operators, keeping a uniform schedule for transconti- nental container 
trains) to organise regular railway container routes, the frequen- cy of container cargo 
deliveries from China to Europe and from Europe to China is, considering door-to-door 
delivery, significantly higher than that offered by maritime transport. Besides, strict 
adherence to railway schedules (according to CRCT, 99.7% of all container trains running 
along China–Europe routes complete their journeys on schedule) and delivery times at 
approximately one-third of those offered by mari- time transport guarantee a wide margin of 
“convenience”. 
Therefore, “convenience” elasticity of demand with respect to railway container traf- fic 
between China and Europe is currently (in the present economic environment) almost 
100%: in 2011–2016, the number of weekly train departures and the volume of container 
traffic have been growing virtually at the same rate, in the absence of any pronounced changes 
in freight rates (Figure 15). 
With railway container freight rates along China–Europe routes remaining virtually 
unchanged throughout 2012–2016, container traffic is growing in parallel to the num- ber of 
departures of container trains, which deliver cargoes approximately twice as fast as maritime 
transport. When Chinese (and European) consignors get an opportunity 
 
 
 
Figure 15. 
Changes in Contai- 
ner Trains’ Frequen- 
cy of Departure and 
Volume of Freight 
Traffic along PRC–
Europe–PRC 
Routes, 2011–2016 
 
Source: 
in-house 
calculations 
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to dispatch switchable cargoes by container trains along regular high-speed routes, they will 
use it. This is borne out by container trainloads remaining stable through- out 2012–2016 at 
about 42 FEU per train (which corresponds to the standard num- ber of platforms in a 
container train). On the other hand, there is the issue of filling containers returning from 
Europe to China. In 2016, container trainloads along those routes rapidly decreased to 28 
FEU per train. 
If current through freight rates are preserved (subject to Chinese subsidies), the China–
Europe container traffic growth potential generated by the margin of “conve- nience” 
(promptness, regularity and door-to-door delivery) is far from exhausted and according to the 
program Construction and Development Planning for the Sino-Europe Train (2016–2020), 
designed by the National Development and Reform Commission of the PRC, by 2016 it 
may produce a threefold increase in the number of container trains and total container traffic 
(to reach 200,000 FEU). The number of train depar- tures per week (regularity) should also 
go up by a factor of three (to about 100 per week, Table 7). 
 
 
 
 
Volume of Container 
Traffic, Thousand FEU 7 14 10 22 40 74 200–250 
* As estimated by the authors 
Table 7. 
Changes 
in Container Trains’ 
Frequency 
of Departure and 
Volume of Freight 
Traffic along PRC–
Europe–PRC Routes, 
2011–2020 
 
Source: 
CRCT 
 
 
Reduction of delivery times on existing and rapidly multiplying routes is still not critical 
(compared to sea delivery times) but it may assume a much more important role after 2020, 
primarily as a competitive advantage among various land routes. 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020* 
Number of Train Departures 
per Week, Units 
0.3 1 2 6 16 33 100 
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9 
See, for example, Maersk Line routes at https://www.maerskline.com/routes/browse-routes. 
 
 
Speed and Regularity of Sea Container Shipping 
 
Maritime transport delivery speeds remain rather low (including those 
of modern container ships). Vessels travelling along the China–Europe route 
run at 20–25 knots, while average total travel time, including the Suez Canal 
passage and port calls, is 35–45 days9. Besides, there always remains the risk 
of delays for natural and other reasons (such as waiting for loading at the 
port of departure). 
Regularity (rhythmicity) of maritime container traffic between the ports 
of the EU and China is rather high. For example, Maersk Line alone makes 
six runs per week. However, when using the sea route to carry containers 
between the EU and China, one has to take into account not only the 
actual travel time (4–6 weeks), but also the time required for consolidation 
of cargoes in ports (about 1 week). 
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4. Assessment of Potential Freight Traffic 
Growth Along the China–EAEU–EU Axis 
 
4.1. Assessment of Additional Freight Traffic Served by 
Railway Routes between EAEU Member States and China 
 
Freight Traffic from the EAEU to the PRC 
The specialisation of EAEU member states in the international division of labour (supply 
to the global market of predominantly Fuel and Energy Products, Mineral and Chemical Raw 
Materials, Timber, Agricultural Raw Materials, Semi-Finished Prod- ucts, etc. In other 
words, cargoes whose carriage in containers is not economically or technologically viable 
or typical) determines the low share of container cargoes in the structure of their export 
freight traffic, including exports to China. 
A comprehensive analysis of the structure of export freight traffic from EAEU mem- ber 
states to China shows that 96–97% of its total volume is represented by solid and liquid bulk 
cargoes. For example, at the end of 2016 the structure of EAEU exports to China (in 
volume terms) was dominated by Fuel (65% of total volume), Timber (15%), Mineral 
Raw Materials (9%) and Mineral Fertilisers (4–5%). 
Only 3–4% of EAEU–China freight traffi was represented by containerisable cargoes and an 
even smaller fraction by cargoes that can in principle be transported by railway containers. The 
steady increase in the volume and share of container shipments in total freight traffi gives rise to 
optimistic forecasts regarding the prospects of container traf- fi  growth, subject to development 
of the EAEU transport and logistical infrastructure. 
The aggregate volume of container traffic from EAEU member states to China cur- rently 
stands at merely 2–2.5 million tons per year (approximately 75–100,000 FEU/ 150–200,000 
TEU). This means that less than one half of the relatively small volume of containerisable 
cargoes mentioned above is actually delivered in containers and there is ample room for 
growth. 
Most container traffic from Russia and other EAEU member states to China is mul- 
timodal traffic with the use of railway transport. In most cases, China-bound export cargoes 
(mostly originating from Russia) are delivered by railway containers to the ports of the 
Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Barents Sea, or White Sea and transferred to ships. Only 
10–20% of Russian export container traffic (11,000 FEU/21,000 TEU in 2016, according 
to Russian Railways) is transported directly to China by rail- way through border 
crossing points at Zabaykalsk (80–100%) and Grodekovo (18% in 2016). A small fraction 
of Kazakhstani container cargoes is now delivered directly to China by railway through 
border crossing points at Dostyk and Altynkol and Be- larusian container cargoes through 
Russian and Kazakhstani border crossing points. 
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The commodity structure of direct export railway container traffi from EAEU member states 
(mostly Russia) to China through land border crossing points is heavily domi- nated by one 
commodity group, “Other Cargoes”: Metal Products (including empty re- turn containers), 
Paper, Chemicals (Attachment 2, Table A2.4). In 2015–2016, there was a considerable increase 
in the commodity structure of Russian railway container ship- ments to China of exported 
“Timber Cargoes” (via Zabaykalsk), specifi Sawn Timber used to fi up empty return containers 
(a long-standing practice in Europe). The growth of container shipments exported through 
Grodekovo is also linked to the return to China of empty containers (classifi in Russian Railways 
statistics as Metalware) due to a sharp increase in 2016 of the volume of container traffi from 
China to Russia through land crossing points and consequently, of the number of empty return 
containers. 
An analysis of the commodity structure of EAEU exports to China in the context of 
selecting commodities switchable to railway container shipments shows that the potential 
for such a switch is rather small in terms of volume. In recent years, the vol- ume of exports 
from EAEU member states to China of cargoes suitable for the switch to railway container 
shipments has been 20–30,000 tons (approximately 2–3,000 TEU/ 1–1,500 FEU) per year, 
sustaining a twofold decrease over the last 10 years. About 60–70% of that freight traffic is 
generated by Russia (1.5–2,000 TEU/1,000 FEU) and 20% by Kazakhstan (up to 1,000 
TEU/500 FEU). That is predominantly additional freight traffic potentially switchable to 
railway routes for delivery of cargoes from Rus- sia and other EAEU member states to China. 
However, that “addition” is quite small, even relative to the existing volume of railway 
container traffic from EAEU member states to China through land crossing points and can 
raise that volume only by ap- proximately 15%. 
The potential for increasing container traffic from EAEU member states to China is se- verely 
limited by the lack of suitable cargoes, either now or in the foreseeable future. Maximum 
additional China-bound freight traffic (50,000 FEU) can be achieved exclu- sively by 
developing new export product niches. At the same time, existing practical experience of 
expanding railway container shipments to China from EAEU member states and EU 
countries indicates that it is possible to enhance the commodity struc- ture of freight traffic 
with such cargoes as Timber, Metal Products (e.g. Ferrous Alloys), Metalware, Pulp and Paper 
Products, Food Products, Prepacked Petrochemical Prod- ucts, etc. In terms of short-term 
and mid-term expansion of railway-carried exports from Russia to China, the most high-
potential FEACN position is Commodity Group 84, “Engineering Products” (classified by 
Russian Railways as “Other Cargoes”10). The volume of exports is currently insignificant 
both in absolute and relative terms, but it has a huge growth potential, especially as Russian 
and Chinese machine build- ers step up their production cooperation. 
 
 
10 
According to UNCTAD statistics, in 2014–2016, the structure of Russian Engineering Products exports to China was unsur- 
prisingly dominated by Equipment for Atomic Power Stations (1–1,500 tons per year), Airplane Engines (500 tons per year), 
Passenger Vehicles with engine cubic capacity of 1,500–3,000 cm3 (up to 4,800 tons per year) and Lasers (200 tons per 
year). Russia is the global technological leader in manufacturing most of those products; the best prospects are associated 
with nuclear power (possible major supplies to China of fast-neutron reactors), airplane building (supplies of jet engines 
for civil aviation, composite materials and titanium blocks and parts for future Chinese airplanes) and laser equipment. 
However, the probability of a manifold increase in the volume of supplies is rather remote. 
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Freight Traffic from the PRC to the EAEU 
The commodity structure of exports from China (which is now the “workshop of the world”) 
is dominated by finished processed goods with prevalence of container or con- tainerisable 
cargoes. Trade between China and Germany shows that Chinese exports can be fully 
containerised. The share of container cargoes in the structure of EAEU imports from China 
has reached 55% (with the volume of such cargoes growing in absolute terms) and the 
commodity structure of freight traffic (which is dominated by containerisable commodity 
groups) stimulates its further containerisation, which may potentially approach 100%. 
The commodity structure of direct Russian railway imports from China through 
crossing points at the border with China (28,000 FEU/55,000 TEU in 2016) is domi- nated 
by “Other Cargoes” (according to the Russian Railways classification) which consists, 
among other things, of “Industrial Consumer Goods” (20–30%) and “Metal- ware”, as well as 
“Machines, Machine Tools, Engines” (20–25% each) (Attachment 2, Table A2.5). 
The commodity structure of railway container traffic from China to other EAEU mem- ber 
states is not materially different from the commodity structure of freight traffic to Russia; 
the volume of that traffic is estimated at 7,500 FEU/15,000 TEU per year (with 
Kazakhstan being the leading counterparty). Therefore, total import container traffic from 
China to EAEU member states through land borders can be estimated at 35,000 
FEU/70,000 TEU per year. 
An analysis of the volume and commodity structure of EAEU imports from China shows 
a large potential for future growth of railway container traffic (Attachment 2, Table A2.7). 
According to our estimates, the volume of EAEU imports from China switchable to 
railway transport amounts to 4–5.5 million tons per year (which is, subject to average 
container load, equivalent to 250–300,000 FEU/500–600,000 TEU). In other words, about 10–
15% of existing potential is currently being used and freight traffic could be increased by a 
factor of eight or nine. 
The main commodity group comprising freight traffic from China to the EAEU switch- able to 
railway transport is “Machines, Equipment, Industrial Products” (75–80%); another 20% is 
represented by Consumer Goods (Clothing, Footwear, Textiles) and 1.5–2% by Finished 
Chemical Products. These cargoes make up most of the goods im- ported by Russia (and other 
EAEU member states) from China in railway containers. Cargoes classified under 
Engineering Products Components (including Motor Vehicle Components) could be switched 
to railway transport in the most economically and technologically efficient manner. 
Chinese companies seeking to implement new production projects in Russia, Kazakh- stan 
and other EAEU member states (including, for example, automobile plants) are interested in 
organising supply logistics so as to assure timely, regular and volume- flexible deliveries at 
costs (freight rates) that will not have a material impact on the ultimate aggregate cost of 
production at localised enterprises. Such terms can be se- cured by railway container 
shipments from Chinese plants to their counterparties 
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in EAEU member states, using subsidies offered by Chinese authorities to support 
railway freight traffic in certain provinces of the PRC. 
One of the conditions for successful implementation of such a scenario for develop- ment of 
freight traffi between China and EAEU member states is modernisation of the EAEU 
transport and logistical infrastructure. This applies not only to de- bottlenecking of 
border crossing points (gauge change points, related logistical terminal infrastructure, 
border and customs corridors), but also to improvement of transport capacity of the 
EAEU railway infrastructure as a whole and creation of “distribution” transport and 
logistics centres (TLCs) at critical transport hubs (Vinokurov and Tsukarev, 2018). 
The lack in EAEU member states of an adequate cargo base to load return contain- ers is a 
serious problem which considerably limits the potential for boosting rail- way container 
traffic from China and which is likely to defy solution in the foresee- able future. The share 
of cargoes switchable to railway transport in the total volume of goods exported by EAEU 
member states to China is insignificant. Only the total potential volume of all 
containerisable China-bound EAEU cargoes can match the volume of Chinese cargoes 
transported to EAEU member states. 
 
4.2. Assessment of Additional Freight Traffic 
Served by Railway Routes between EU Countries and China 
 
Freight Traffic from the PRC to the EU 
Stimulation by Chinese authorities of railway freight traffi between China and Europe using 
BRI transport corridors (by subsidising carriage through Chinese territory), the main driver of 
the current fast growth, will if continued, improve the prospects of fur- ther expansion of that 
traffi Along with other factors, subsidy of international rail- way freight traffi through Chinese 
territory prompts, at least to some extent, a switch of transit cargo fl ws from the Trans-Siberian 
Railway to the route passing through Ka- zakhstan (through border crossing points at Dostyk 
and Altynkol), where the Chinese section is much longer. 
The considerable volume of trade turnover between China and the EU (about 100 million tons per 
year), combined with complete dominance of container cargoes and contain- erisable cargoes in 
the structure of mutual deliveries, creates objective preconditions for diversifi of freight traffi 
by its partial switch from maritime to railway transport, which is faster, more accurate in terms 
of delivery times and more convenient for a sig- nifi        part of Chinese and European 
consignors/consignees. 
The volume of EU railway imports from China is growing even faster than European rail- way 
exports to China and in 2016 it approached 50,000 FEU/100,000 TEU (Attachment 2, Table 
A2.8). The commodity structure of transit railway container traffi from China to the EU 
(through crossing points at the border with China) and from the EU to China is dominated by 
“Other Cargoes” (99%). That commodity group is made up of Metal- ware (about 50%), 
Industrial Consumer Goods (approximately 30%) and Machines, 
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Machine Tools, Engines (10%). The dynamic growth of railway freight traffi from China to the 
EU noted by the latest statistical reports and the considerable volume of such traffi refl t the 
huge export potential of China for a further increase of exports and the comparable demand for 
imported goods on the part of the European market. The rapid growth in 2014–2016 of freight 
traffi from China to Europe using the transit potential of EAEU member states galvanises 
EAEU policy in the area of development and promo- tion of its transport and logistical 
infrastructure. 
The volume of goods (cargoes) imported by the EU from China that are switchable to 
railway container transport exceeds the volume of similar European exports by ap- proximately 
a factor of 5.5 and amounts to 20–22 million tons per year (Attachment 2, Table A2.9). 
Calculated in containers subject to historical container fi rates, potential new container traffi 
generated by the switch could reach 2–2.2 million FEU/4–4.5 mil- lion TEU per year. The 
commodity structure is almost exclusively made up of two groups: Engineering Products (70–
75%) and Clothing,  Footwear,  Textiles  (20–25%),  with the shares of other commodity 
groups not exceeding 1–2%. 
The long-term potential for boosting Chinese export railway traffic to the EU, practi- cally 
unlimited from a structural point of view (according to our estimates, it could increase more 
than 40-fold), may be inhibited by certain limitations related to gen- erating reciprocal 
container traffic from Europe. In 2016, the entire potential volume of EU exports to China 
switchable to railway transport (175,000 FEU/350,000 TEU) exceeded  the  actual  railway  
freight  traffic  from  China  to  the  EU  (almost 50,000 FEU/100,000 TEU) by a factor of 
3.5. 
 
Freight Traffic from the EU to the PRC 
The rapid, manifold growth of railway freight traffic from the EU to China over the last 
several years, confirmed by foreign trade statistics published by Eurostat, China and Russian 
Railways, reflects the existing potential of the EU countries for further increase of exports 
and the demand for European products generated by the Chi- nese market. The build-up 
of transcontinental freight traffic using the EAEU transit potential, is also indicative of the 
grossly underutilised capacity of land routes and galvanises EAEU policy in the area of 
development and debottlenecking of transport and logistical systems. 
The commodity structure of transit railway container traffi from the EU to Chi- na 
(through crossing points at the border with China) is completely dominated by “Other 
Cargoes” (96–99%, Attachment 2, Table A2.10). The group is made up of Motor 
Vehicles, Metalware and Machines, Machine Tools, Engines, with the shares of those 
components  varying  from  year  to  year within  a  relatively  wide  range. In terms of 
prospects of increasing railway freight traffi from the EU to China, the most promising 
transit commodity groups include Motor Vehicles, Engineering Products and Chemical 
Products. 
Over the last decade, the volume of EU exports to China switchable to railway 
container transport has increased by 70% to reach 3.8–4 million tons per year (approximately   
170–180,000   FEU/350,000   TEU)   (Attachment   2,  Table  A2.11). 
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Structurally, those exports are dominated by Engineering Products (broadly defined, 
including Industrial Equipment, Electric Equipment and Radio Electronic Devices, Motor 
Vehicles, Tools, etc.), accounting for about 95%. Finished Chemical Products account for 
another 2–3% and Clothing, Footwear, Textiles for about 2%, while the shares of the 
remaining commodity groups are insignificant. According to Eurostat, in 2016, Motor 
Vehicles accounted for more than 1/3 of EU railway exports to China by volume and for 2/3 
in value terms. 
In structural terms according to our estimates, EU export to China of cargoes switchable to 
railway transport could be increased approximately sevenfold—from 25,000 FEU/50,000 
TEU to 175,000 FEU/350,000 TEU, with good prospects of further growth on the back of 
the relatively faster increase in the volume of delivery of more “expensive” commodities. 
 
4.3. Assessment of Additional Freight Traffic Served by Railway 
Routes between EAEU Member States and the EU 
 
Freight Traffic from the EAEU to the EU 
The overwhelming domination of “non-containerisable” cargoes in the commodity structure 
of EAEU exports to the EU leaves container cargoes with a minuscule share of less than 1%. 
The rate of containerisation of railway-carried EAEU exports to the EU is approximately 
the same. According to Russian Railways and foreign trade sta- tistics, the share of railway-
carried container cargoes in Russian exports to the EU stands at 1–2% of their total 
volume. Like Russian railway-carried exports to the EU, the share  of  container  cargoes  in  
railway-carried EU-bound shipments originat- ing from other EAEU member states is very 
small, which is consistent with the na- ture of the cargoes dispatched to Europe. Aggregate 
railway container traffic from EAEU member states to the EU through land border crossing 
points can be estimated at 20–25,000 FEU/40–50,000 TEU per year, with approximately 
one third of that volume represented by containerised Chemical Raw Materials going to 
Finnish ports (organic hydrocarbons, spirits, etc., which are not normally classifi as 
cargoes suitable for railway container transport). 
The volume of EAEU exports to the EU switchable to railway container transport 
amounts to about 500,000 tons per year (approximately 25,000 FEU/50,000 TEU) 
(Attachment 2, Table A2.12). Structurally, the largest commodity groups are Metal 
Products (about 50%) and Engineering Products (35–45%), with Clothing, Footwear, 
Textiles accounting for another 4–5%. Almost all those cargoes could be converted into 
additional container traffic, which could then be attracted to transport routes along the 
China–EAEU–EU axis, doubling the volume of Europe-bound container traffic, subject to 
optimal use and further improvement of the EAEU transport and logistical infrastructure. 
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Freight Traffic from the EU to the EAEU 
Container cargoes account for 20–25% of total EAEU imports from the Europe- an 
Union; in recent years, their volume has been declining and currently stands at 4.5–5 
million tons per year. The volume of railway-carried containerised imports from the EU is 
declining even faster and currently amounts to about 0.5 million tons per year (25,000 
FEU/50,000 TEU). Structurally, the share of Engineering Products in total railway 
container traffic from the EU to the EAEU is about 40%, the share of Mineral and 
Chemical Raw Materials (organic acids, spirits, etc.) is 25–30% and the share of Finished 
Chemical Products is 15–20%. 
The main commodity group comprising freight traffic from the EU to the EAEU 
(totalling about 3 million tons, or 150,000 FEU/300,000 TEU) which is suitable for the 
switch torailwaytransport is“Machines,Equipment,Industrial Products”with 80–85% and 
another 10% is represented by Finished Chemical Products (Attachment  2, Table A2.13). 
These cargoes basically make up most of the goods imported by Russia and other EAEU 
member states from the EU in railway containers. 
The capacity for switching EAEU-bound freight traffic originating from the EU to rail- way 
transport is currently used by 15–20%, and maximal utilisation of the opportuni- ties offered 
by the EAEU transport and logistical infrastructure could increase railway container traffic 
along that direction by a factor of 5–6. 
In the long run, certain problems may be created by the imbalance in the EU–EAEU 
railway container traffic, with the share of switchable cargoes in EAEU exports to the EU 
being considerably less than in EU exports to the EAEU. 
 
4.4. Aggregated Assessment of Additional Freight 
Traffic along the China–EAEU–EU Axis 
Based on the results of comprehensive analysis of freight traffi along the China–EAEU– EU axis 
(with special emphasis on railway container traffi and application of the pro- posed 
methodological approach to selecting cargoes switchable to railway transport, we present the 
following aggregated assessment of potential additional freight traffi 
West–East, railway container traffic, current status: 
•    EAEU China—10–12,000 FEU (20–25,000 TEU); 
•    EU China—25,000 FEU (50,000 TEU); 
•    EU EAEU—25,000 FEU (50,000 TEU). 
East–West, railway container traffic, current status: 
•    China EAEU—35,000 FEU (70,000 TEU); 
•    China EU—50,000 FEU (100,000 TEU); 
•    EAEU EU—20–25,000 FEU (40–50,000 TEU). 
Therefore, the aggregate volume of railway container traffi along the China– EAEU–EU 
axis is currently estimated at 170,000 FEU/330–345,000 TEU (West–East: 60,000 FEU; 
East–West: 110,000 FEU) (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. 
Actual Volume 
of Container Traffic 
along the PRC- 
EAEU–EU Axis 
Served by Railway 
Transport in 2016 
 
Source: 
authors’ 
estimations 
25 Thousand FEU 
 
 
20–25 Thousand FEU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
West–East, maximum additional container traffi that could be attracted to EAEU railway 
networks: 
•    EAEU China—50,000 FEU (100,000 TEU); 
•    EU China—150,000 FEU (300,000 TEU); 
•    EU EAEU—125,000 FEU (250,000 TEU). 
East–West, maximum additional container traffic that could be attracted to EAEU railway 
networks: 
•    China EAEU—250,000 FEU (500,000 TEU); 
•    China EU—2,100,000 FEU (4,200,000 TEU); 
•    EAEU EU—25,000 FEU (50,000 TEU). 
Therefore, according to our calculations the maximum additional container traffic that 
could be attracted to EAEU railway networks is estimated at 2.7 million FEU (5.4 
million TEU), including West–East traffic of 325,000 FEU (650,000 TEU) and East–
West traffic of 2,375,000 FEU (4,750,000 TEU) (Figure 17). 
However, the large imbalance between existing and additional West–East and East– West 
freight traffic may prevent EAEU railway networks from attracting all potential freight 
traffic along the China–EAEU–EU axis. 
With balanced container loads (containers travelling both ways fully loaded with opti- mal 
cargoes, no empty containers), additional container traffic that could be attracted by EAEU 
railway networks can be estimated at 1–1.1 million TEU, while total freight traffic along the 
axis (including existing traffic) could be as high as 1.3 million TEU. 
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125 Thousand FEU 
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Figure 17. 
Maximum Container 
Traffic that Could 
Be Additionally 
Attracted by EAEU 
Railway Networks 
 
Source: 
authors’ 
estimations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the existing East–West/West–East container traffic imbalance (2:1) persists and West–
East trains additionally take on any containerisable cargoes (subject to ade- quate 
development of transport and logistical infrastructure in EAEU member states and subject 
further to active cooperation of EAEU railway companies with their coun- terparts in China 
and the EU and with consignors/consignees potentially interested in using railway transport), 
in the long term, aggregate railway container traffic along the China–EAEU–EU axis could 
reach 2 million TEU per year. 
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ATTACHMENT  1 
 
 
Place of the EU, China and the EAEU in Global Economy and Trade 
The EU has the world’s second-largest GDP (after the USA) with a 22–25% share of glob- al 
GDP. At the end of 2016, China’s share of global GDP reached almost 15% (a more than 
twofold growth over the last decade), while the share of the EAEU was 2–3%. 
In terms of foreign trade, the EU is the world’s largest exporter and importer region in value 
terms. Its total exports and imports in 2016 (including mutual intra-European deliveries) 
amounted to $5.4 billion and $5.3 billion, respectively, accounting for ap- proximately one 
third of total global trade. China is the world’s largest exporter coun- try ($2.1 trillion, or 13% 
of global exports) and the world’s second largest importer country (after the USA) ($1.7 
trillion, or 10% of global imports). In volume terms, EU imports (3.5 billion tons in 2016) 
come second only to the Asia–Pacific Region, while China (more than 2.4 billion tons) is 
the undisputed APR leader, staying far ahead of all other countries in the world with 19% 
of total global imports in volume terms. The volume of EU and Chinese exports (2.4 billion 
tons and about 0.7 billion tons in 2016, respectively) makes them the world’s most important 
suppliers (along- side Russia, Australia and the USA). 
Over the last decade, the total volume of EAEU exports has increased by 16% (to 1.2 bil- lion 
tons in 2016) and accounts for 9–10% of total global trade by volume, while the share of the 
EAEU in global imports is about 2%. 
 
EAEU and PRC Foreign Trade 
The “Fuel” commodity group dominates the structure of EAEU exports to China (by 
volume). Over  the  last  decade, its  share  has doubled to reach 65% in 2016 (Figure A1.1). 
Goods from the “Fuel” group exported to China are represented mostly by Crude Oil (2016: 
47.6 million tons from Russia, 3.2 million tons from Kazakhstan) and Coal (16 million tons 
from Russia). The volumes of exports of Petroleum Prod- ucts, Natural Gas and other Fuel 
products are significantly smaller. 
In recent years, Timber (Round Timber and Sawn Timber) supplied to the Chinese market 
from Russia (almost 20 million tons in 2016) has accounted for about 15% of total EAEU 
exports to China. The share of Mineral Raw Materials in the structure of 2016 exports 
decreased to 9% (from 20% or more in previous years). This can be attributed to a 
reduction of supplies to China of Iron Ore from Kazakhstan and Rus- sia (the profi y of 
such supplies declined due to a global price slump). Mineral Fertilisers also account for a 
sizeable share of exports to China (4–5%, countries of origin: Russia and Belarus). The 
shares of remaining commodities are much less signifi 
The commodity structure of EAEU imports from China is much more diversified. The 
commodity group “Machinery, Equipment and Industrial Products” accounts for the bulk 
(25–30%) of total supplies; “Metal Products” for about 15%; “Finished 
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Figure A1.1. 
Commodity 
Structure of EAEU 
Exports to China 
in 2016, % 
 
Source: 
UNCTAD 
Food and Agricultural Raw Materials 
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Fertilisers 
Finished Chemical Products 
Timber, Cork and Timber/Cork Products 
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Metals and Metal Products 
Machines, Equipment, Industrial Products 
 
 
 
Chemical Products”, “Finished Construction Materials” and “Food and Agricultural Raw 
Materials” for approximately 10% each; “Mineral and Chemical Raw Materi- als” with 
“Clothing, Footwear, Textiles” accounting for 6–8% each (Figure A1.2). The shares of 
other commodity groups are insignificant. 
Russia, as the largest EAEU economy, strongly dominates the structure of EAEU fo- reign 
trade freight traffi It accounts for about 3/4 of imports from the PRC and now more than 
90% of exports to the PRC (previously, 75–80%). Kazakhstan remains Chi- na’s second-
largest trade partner in the EAEU. Belarus accounts for approximate- ly 2% of import 
and export freight traffi between the EAEU and China. The share of Kyrgyzstan in EAEU 
imports from China is about 5%, that of Armenia—1%; both countries’ shares in total 
EAEU exports to China are insignifi  (approximately 0.1% each). 
The commodity structure of export freight traffic from EAEU member states to China is 
characterised by a low percentage of containerised cargoes (1.5–2%, or 2–2.5 mil- lion tons 
per year) due to the absolute domination in commodity structure of “un- containerisable” 
cargoes (Fuel, Mineral Raw Materials, Timber, Mineral Fertilisers, Agricultural Raw 
Materials). Over the last decade, the share of container cargoes in EAEU imports from 
China has considerably increased from 35% to 55%, with physi- cal volume of container 
supplies going up from less than 6 million tons to 7–9 million tons per year. The commodity 
structure of import freight traffic, already dominated by containerisable cargoes, is 
stimulating its continued containerisation. 
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PRC and EU Foreign Trade 
Despite the impressive value of mutual trade turnover between the EU and China ($560–
600 billion in recent years), physical volumes are relatively modest (about 90–100 million 
tons per year) (Attachment 2, Table A2.2). Over 2011–2016, EU imports from China have 
exceeded EU exports to China by a factor of approximately two in va- lue terms and by 25–
40% in volume. However, the mutual trade imbalance is gradually decreasing, especially by 
volume. While in value terms EU imports from China over the last decade have increased by 
approximately 20% and EU exports to China by 90%, in terms of volume, EU imports from 
China have not changed or have even slightly de- creased (from 65–75 million tons to 55–60 
million tons) and EU exports to China have more than doubled (to almost 50 million tons). 
This has an indirect positive impact on development of their mutual container trade, 
reducing the considerable number of empty return containers travelling to China from EU 
countries. 
In terms of the geographical structure of EU–China trade, China’s largest trade part- ners in 
Europe (by volume) are Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, with Belgium, 
France, Italy, Spain and Poland also holding signifi        positions. 
Comprehensive analysis of available statistical data on the structure of trade between EU 
countries and China, with a breakdown by modes of transport, has shown that about 98% of 
mutual EU–China deliveries are made by maritime transport, with aviation transport and 
railway transport accounting for 1.5–2% and 0.5–1%, respectively. 
2 
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ATTACHMENT 2 
 
 
Table A2.1. 
Changes in Mutual 
 
Trade between 
the EAEU and 
Trade Turnover between 
the EAEU and China 
 
51 
 
71 
 
51 
 
76 
 
108 
 
116 
 
117 
 
109 
 
79 
 
78 
China in Value in Value Terms, $ Billion  
and Volume Terms,  
2007–2016  
Source: 
UNCTAD 
 
EAEU Exports 
to China 21 29 23 30 52 53 51 48 35 33  
Trade Turnover between 
the EAEU and China 
by Volume, Million Tons 
 
81 
 
75 
 
86 
 
90 
 
118 
 
130 
 
130 
 
127 
 
117 
 
130 
EAEU Imports 
from   China 14 18 9 13 16 17 18 17 12 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.2. 
Changes in Mutual 
Trade between 
the EU and China 
in Value and 
Volume Terms, 
2007–2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade Turnover between 
the EU and China 
in Value Terms, $ Billion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
419 482 415 527 601 561 569 620 578 570 
 
Source: 
Eurostat 
EU  Exports  to  China 98 115 115 150 190 185 197 219 189 188 
EU Imports from China 77 67 45 54 57 49 53 59 59 60 
Table A2.3. 
Comparative 
Changes in Freight 
Indices and Volume 
of Container Traffic 
along PRC–Europe 
Routes, 2009–2017 
* Shanghai 
Containerised 
Freight Index 
 
EU Exports to China 23 26 33 33 38 39 40 41 45 49 
 
 
Indicator 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
SCFI*  Shanghai–Northern 
Europe, $ per FEU 2,581 3,310 1,630 2,503     2,005 2,148 1,164 1,264 1,423  
Increase y-o-y, % 28 –51 54 –20 7 –46 9 13 
SCFI Shanghai– 
Mediterranean, $ per FEU 2,584 3,217 1,800 2,472 2,129 2,318 1,367 1,251 1,351 
 
Sources: Container Traffic, China–EU, Million FEU
 4.9
 5.9 6.2 5.7 5.6 6.3 6.1 6.4 … 
Eurostat, 
UNCTAD (2016), 
Shanghai Shipping 
Exchange 
         
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
EAEU Imports 
from China 
 
29 
 
42 
 
28 
 
46 
 
57 
 
63 
 
66 
 
61 
 
44 
 
46 
 
EAEU Exports 
to China 
 
67 
 
58 
 
77 
 
77 
 
102 
 
113 
 
112 
 
110 
 
105 
 
117 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
EU Imports from China 321 366 300 376 411 375 372 401 389 381 
 
Trade Turnover between 
the EU and China 
by Volume, Million Tons 
 
100 
 
93 
 
78 
 
86 
 
95 
 
88 
 
94 
 
100 
 
105 
 
109 
 
Increase y-o-y, % 24 –44 37 –14 9 –41 –9 8 
 
Increase y-o-y, % –13 21 6 –8 –2 13 –4 5 … 
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 Table A2.4. 
Commodity Struc- 
Export Freight Traffic from Russia to China 
through Crossing Points at the Border 
 
7.3 
 
11.2 
 
8.5 
 
6.9 
 
6.2 
 
6.5 
 
10.6 
ture of Export 
Railway Container 
with China, Total        Traffic from Russia 
        to China through 
including        Crossing Points 
        at the Border with 
        China, 2010–2016, 
Timber Cargoes 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.3 2.2 5.3 by Volume, 
 Thousand FEU 
Source: 
Institute of the 
Economy and 
Transport Deve- 
lopment based 
Paper 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.5 1.7 1.2 1.3 on Russian Railways 
statistics 
 
 
Metalware 
 
2.7 
 
5.0 
 
1.4 
 
0.8 
 
1.2 
 
0.9 
 
2.6 
 
Chemicals and Sodium Carbonate 2.7 3.1 3.6 3.4 2.8 2.0 1.0 
 
 
 
Main Commodity Groups 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Import Freight Traffic from China to Russia 
through Crossing Points at the Border 
with China, Total 
 
 
Other Cargoes (Mineral Construction 
Cargoes, Ferrous Metals) 
 
Remaining Cargoes 20.7 
 
25.8 24.2 
 
21.3 17.8 
 
16.0 26.4 
 
of which: 
Motor  Vehicles 3.0 6.8 6.0 3.8 1.5 1.1 0.9 
on Russian Railways 
statistics 
Metalware 4.1 4.7 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.1 5.7 
Chemicals and Sodium Carbonate 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.0 4.3 
including 
Main Commodity Groups 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
Other Cargoes 7.3 
 
10.5 7.9 
 
6.8 5.9 
 
4.2 5.2 
 
of which: 
 
 
Machines, Machine Tools, Engines 
 
3.5 
 
5.1 
 
6.0 
 
5.8 
 
5.4 
 
3.2 
 
4.8 
 
 
Industrial Consumer Goods 
 
6.7 
 
5.6 
 
4.6 
 
4.1 
 
3.6 
 
4.8 
 
9.4 
 
 Table A2.5. 
Commodity Struc- 
ture of Import 
22.1 27.2 25.0 22.0 18.6 16.7 27.7 Railway Container 
       Traffic from China 
       to Russia through 
       Crossing Points 
       at the Border with 
       China, 2010–2016, 
1.4 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.3 by Volume, 
Thousand FEU 
 Source: 
Institute of the 
Economy and 
Transport Deve- 
lopment based 
 
60 61 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.6. 
Weekly China– 
Europe Container 
Trains Schedule 
(since January 2018) 
 
Source: 
China Railways 
Container Transport 
Co. Ltd. (CRCT): 
http://www.crct. 
com/index.php?m= 
content&c=index&a= 
lists&catid=22 
 
No. Route Index 
Regularity 
(Frequency) 
 
Point of Departure Time of  Transit Route 
Departure Time, days 
 
Border Crossing Point Country of Destination 
 
Transit Countries 
1 X8001 1 per week Zhengzhou North 13:52  
 
 
~ 15 days 
 
 
 
Zhengzhou–Hamburg 
 
 
Alashankou 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
2 X8003 1 per week Zhengzhou North 8:04 
3 X8005 1 per week Zhengzhou North 1:59 
4 X8069 1 per week Zhengzhou North 4:00 Khorgos 
 
5 
 
X8202/3 
 
2 per week 
 
Yutian 
 
18:40 
 
~ 15 days 
Zhengzhou (Wuhan)– 
Hamburg 
 
Erenhot 
 
Germany 
 
Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
6 X8014/3 1 per week Chongqing 10:57  
 
 
 
~ 15 days 
 
 
 
 
Chongqing–Duisburg 
Alashankou/Khorgos  
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
7 X8020/19 2 per week Chongqing 12:49 Alashankou 
8 X8076/5 every other day Chongqing 10:30 Khorgos 
9 X8084/3 daily Chongqing 7:01 Alashankou 
10 X8434 3 per week Chongqing 18:58 Erenhot Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
11 X8412/1 2 per week Chongqing 17:34 ~ 10 days Chongqing–Cherkessk Manchuria Russia Russia 
12 X8016/5 1 per week Chengdu North 23:15  
 
 
 
 
~ 12–15 
days 
 
 
 
 
 
Chengdu–Łodź/ 
Nuremberg/Tilburg 
 
 
 
Alashankou 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland/Germany/ 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, 
Netherlands 
13 X8056/5 1 per week Chengdu North 14:40 
14 X8086/5 daily Chengdu North 22:40 
15 X8090/89 daily Chengdu North 12:26 
16 X8078/7 every other day Chengdu North 7:52  
 
Khorgos 17 X8062/1 1 per week Chengdu North 11:41 
18 X8064/3 1 per week Chengdu North 11:31 
 
19 
 
X8406/5 
 
2 per week 
 
Jiashan 
 
11:34 
~ 12–15 
days 
 
Wuhan–Minsk/Hamburg 
 
Manchuria 
 
Belarus/Russia/Germany 
 
Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
20 X8017/8/7 2 per week Jiashan 5:38  
 
~ 15 days 
 
Wuhan–Pardubice/Łódź/ 
Hamburg/Duisburg 
Alashankou  
Czech Republic/Poland/ 
Germany 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Germany 
21 X8011/2/1 1 per week Jiashan 22:29 Alashankou 
22 X8035/6/5 1 per week Jiashan 13:40 Alashankou/Khorgos 
 
23 
 
X8024 
 
1 per week 
 
Hefei East 
 
18:10 
 
~ 18 days 
 
Yiwu–Madrid 
 
Alashankou 
 
Spain 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, 
France, Spain 
24 X8074/3 1 per week Kiaosi/Yiwu 20:44 ~ 12 days Yiwu–Minsk Manchuria Belarus Russia, Belarus 
 
25 
 
X8088/7 
 
1 per week 
 
Kiaosi/Yiwu 
 
12:23 
 
~ 18 days 
 
Yiwu–Istanbul 
 
Khorgos 
 
Turkey 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, 
Turkey 
26 X8066/5 1 per week Hefei East 17:45 ~ 15 days Hefei–Hamburg Alashankou Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
27 X8402/1 3 per week Suzhou West 2:00 ~ 12 days Suzhou–Warsaw Manchuria Poland Russia, Belarus, Poland 
28 X8410/09 1 per week Suzhou West 2:40 ~ 12 days Suzhou–Warsaw Erenhot Poland Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland 
 
29 
 
X8082/1 
 
1 per week 
 
Yuntai 
 
11:36 
 
~ 18 days 
 
Lianyungang–Istanbul 
 
Alashankou 
 
Turkey 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, 
Turkey 
30 X8057 every other day Shenyang East 3:35 ~ 13 days Shenyang–Hamburg Manchuria Germany Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
 
31 
 
X8027 
 
2 per week 
 
Changchun North 
 
11:18 
 
~ 13 days 
Changchun– 
Schwarzheide (Dresden) 
 
Manchuria 
 
Germany 
 
Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
 
  
 
 
No. Route Index  
Regularity 
(Frequency) 
 
Point of Departure Time of  Transit Route 
Departure Time, days 
 
Border Crossing Point 
 
Country of Destination 
 
Transit Countries 
32 X8209/10 1 per week Shenyang East 23:12 ~ 12 days Shenyang–Moscow Erenhot Russia Mongolia, Russia 
33 X8059/60/59 daily Shenyang 9:30 ~ 13 days Shenyang–Hamburg Manchuria Germany Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
34 X8428/7 2 per month Changsha 11:30  
~ 15 days 
 
Changsha–Hamburg 
Alashankou  
Germany 
 
(Kazakhstan/Mongolia), Russia, Belarus, Poland, 
Germany 35 X8422/1 2 per month Guizhou 21:20 Erenhot 
36 X8426/5 3 per week Shilong 6:30 ~ 12 days Guangzhou–Moscow Manchuria Russia Russia 
37 X8302/1 2 per week Tianjin 17:40 ~ 11 days Tianjin–Moscow Manchuria Russia Russia 
 
38 
 
X8303 
 
1 per week 
 
Chifeng 
 
22:38 
 
~ 10 days 
Chifeng–Chelyabinsk/ 
Kleshchikha 
 
Manchuria 
 
Russia 
 
Russia 
39 X8098/7 1 per week Xiamen (Fujian) 9:55 ~ 16 days Xiamen–Hamburg Alashankou Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
40 X8208/7 1 per week Xiamen (Fujian) 11:20 ~ 13 days Xiamen–Moscow Erenhot Russia Mongolia, Russia 
41 X8072/1 1 per week Xuzhou North 23:35 ~ 5 days Nantong–Mazar–i–Sharif Khorgos Afghanistan Kazakhstan, Afghanistan 
 
42 
 
X8031 
 
3 per week 
 
Harbin South 
 
10:36 
~ 10–15 
days 
Harbin–Moscow, Warsaw, 
Hamburg 
 
Manchuria 
 
Russia/Poland/ Germany 
 
Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
43 X8205 1 per week Jining (Nei Mongol) 21:58 ~ 5 days Jining–Moscow Erenhot Russia Mongolia, Russia 
 
44 
 
X8492/1 
 
1 per week 
Jiaozhou 
(Shandong) 
 
2:16 
 
~ 5 days 
 
Jiaozhou–Hanoi 
 
Pingxiang/Dong Dang 
 
Vietnam 
 
Vietnam 
45 X8002 1 per week Alashankou 20:24  
~ 18 days 
 
Hamburg–Zhengzhou 
 
Alashankou 
 
Germany 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
46 X8008 1 per week Alashankou 21:58 
47 
 
48 
 
49 
X8040/39 
X8050/49 
X8306/5 
4 per week 
 
1 per week 
 
2 per week 
Alashankou 
Alashankou 
Erenhot 
20:24 
 
9:30 
 
15:49 
 
 
~ 18 days 
 
 
Duisburg–Chongqing 
Alashankou 
Khorgos 
Erenhot 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
50 X8042 2 per week Alashankou 20:24  
 
~ 18 days 
 
Łódź/Nuremberg/ 
Tilburg–Chengdu 
Alashankou  
Poland, Germany, 
Netherlands 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, 
Netherlands 
51 X8092/1 daily Alashankou 5:16 Alashankou 
52 X8308/7 1 per week Khorgos 9:30 Khorgos 
 
53 
 
X8054/3 
 
1 per week 
 
Alashankou 
 
21:58 
 
~ 20 days 
 
Madrid–Yiwu 
 
Alashankou 
 
Spain 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, 
France, Spain 
54 X8044/3 2 per week Alashankou 21:58 ~ 18 days Hamburg–Wuhan Alashankou Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
55 X8408/7 1 per week Manchuria 22:53 ~ 15 days Brest–Suzhou Manchuria Belarus Russia, Belarus 
56 X8058 1 per week Manchuria 23:50 ~ 15 days Brest–Shenyang Manchuria Belarus Russia, Belarus 
57 X8030/29 2 per week Manchuria 22:02 ~ 15 days Tomsk–Wuhan Manchuria Russia Russia 
58 X8204/1 1 per week Erenhot 15:49 ~ 18 days Hamburg–Zhengzhou Erenhot Germany Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
 
59 
 
X8028 
 
2 per week 
 
Manchuria 
 
0:34 
 
~ 15–18 
days 
Schwarzheide– 
Changchun 
(Tomsk–Harbin) 
 
Manchuria 
 
Germany, Russia 
 
Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany 
60 X8034/3 2 per week Manchuria 22:02 ~ 16 days Tomsk–Chongqing Manchuria Russia Russia 
61 X8206 1 per week Erenhot 17:49 ~ 10 days Vorsino–Jining Erenhot Russia Russia, Mongolia 
 
 
 
62 63 
64 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.7. 
Changes in, 
Commodity 
Groups and 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
Commodity and Countries           
Geographical            Structure of, Import Finished Food           
by EAEU Member Products
 20
 
20 22 28 29 22 17 11 14 15 
States from China 
of Cargoes Switch- Finished Chemical 
able to Railway Products
 31
 
 
48 
 
51 
 
60 
 
66 
 
75 
 
74 
 
76 
 
66 
 
72 
Container Trans- 
port, 2007–2016, Cellulose, Paper, 
Thousand Tons/ Printed Products
 10
 
 
21 
 
16 
 
20 
 
22 
 
20 
 
20 
 
24 
 
14 
 
11 
Thousand FEU 
Textile Fibre, 
Fabrics, Raw Hide
 0
 
Source: 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
UNCTAD Clothing, 
Footwear, Textile 454 
Products 
 
682 
 
534 
 
870 
 
989 
 
1105 
 
1163 
 
1005 
 
642 
 
669 
Metals and Metal 
Products
 28
 
 
42 
 
22 
 
58 
 
46 
 
32 
 
52 
 
49 
 
55 
 
43 
Machines, 
Equipment, 
Industrial 
2,528
 
Products 
 
 
3,199 
 
 
1,911 
 
 
3,022 
 
 
3,711 
 
 
4,252 
 
 
4,185 
 
 
3,801 
 
 
2,84 
 
 
3,156 
TOTAL, 
Thousand Tons 
3,072
 
including 
 
4,012 
 
2,557 
 
4,059 
 
4,863 
 
5,505 
 
5,513 
 
4,967 
 
3,575 
 
3,966 
R ssia 2,556 3,358 2,053 3,284 3,950 4,256 4,311 4,004 2,790 3,069 
Kazakhstan 296 374 330 467 502 824 796 713 489 426 
Belarus 66 95 63 102 138 137 157 68 141 225 
Armenia 13 25 20 29 29 29 28 28 20 30 
Kyrgyzstan 140 160 92 177 245 260 221 154 135 215 
TOTAL, 
Thousand FEU
 192
 
including 
 
251 
 
160 
 
254 
 
304 
 
344 
 
345 
 
310 
 
223 
 
248 
R ssia 160 210 128 205 247 266 269 250 174 192 
Kazakhstan 19 23 21 29 31 52 50 45 31 27 
Belarus 4 6 4 6 9 9 10 4 9 14 
Armenia 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Kyrgyzstan 9 10 6 11 15 16 14 10 8 13 
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Table A2.8. 
 
 
 
 
Transit Freight Traffic from China 
       Commodity Struc- 
ture of Transit 
to the EU through Crossing Points 
at the Border with China, Total 
2.8 3.7 5.8 7.2 15.7 25.2 48.7 Railway Container 
Traffic from China 
to the EU through 
including        Crossing Points 
        at the Border with 
Ferrous Metals 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Motor  Vehicles 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 
China, 2010–2016, 
by Volume, 
Thousand FEU 
 
Source: 
UNCTAD 
 
Machines, Machine Tools, Engines 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.5 2.7 4.9 
Metalware 1.7 2.2 4.4 3.5 8.7 13.5 23.0 
 
Chemicals and Sodium Carbonate 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6 1.2 
Industrial  Consumer  Goods 0.3 0.8 0.6 1.3 4.4 6.8 16.2 
 
 
 
Commodity 
Groups 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
Finished Food 
Products 
 
Finished 
Chemical 
Products 
 
181 
 
180 
 
151 
 
180 
 
185 
 
189 
 
209 
 
217 
 
218 
 
234 
Cellulose, Paper, 
Printed Products 230 256 247 272 289 278 260 265 247 235 
2007–2016, 
Thousand Tons 
 
Source: 
UNCTAD 
 
Clothing, 
Footwear, 
Textile Products 
 
4,848 5,117 4,743 5,212 5,187 4,450 4,587 4,985 4,574 4,687 
 
Metals and 
Metal Products 
 
359 
 
356 
 
235 
 
354 
 
340 
 
299 
 
321 
 
354 
 
323 
 
349 
Machines, 
Equipment, 
Industrial 
Products 
 
 
13,876   14,159 11,226   14,273   14,999   14,141   15,203   17,342   16,144   15,907 
 
TOTAL, 
Thousand Tons 
 
19,529 
 
20,113 
 
16,652   20,352 
 
21,076 
 
19,416   20,626 
 
23,214 
 
21,538 
 
21,451 
TOTAL, 
Thousand FEU 
 
1,953 
 
2,011 
 
1,665 2,035 
 
2,108 
 
1,942 2,063 
 
2,321 
 
2,154 
 
2,145 
Main Commodity Groups 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
Other Cargoes 2.4 3.5 5.6 7.0 15.6 24.9 48.3 
of which: 
 
Textile Fibre, 
Fabrics, Raw 
Hide 
 
9 
 
9 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 Table A2.9. 
Changes in and 
Commodity Struc- 
26 34 44 54 70 53 40 45 26 34 ture of, Import 
by EU Countries 
 from China of Car- 
goes Switchable 
to Railway Con- 
tainer Transport, 
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Table A2.10. 
Commodity Struc- 
ture of Transit 
Railway Container 
Traffic from the EU 
to China through 
Crossing Points 
at the Border with 
 
 
Transit Freight Traffic from the EU 
to China through Crossing Points 
at the Border with China, Total 
 
 
 
0.6 3.1 8.6 3.0 6.0 14.5 25.2 
China, 2010–2016, 
by Volume, 
Thousand FEU 
Ferrous Metals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.8 
 
Source:  
Institute of the 
Economy and 
Transport Deve- 
lopment based 
 
Motor Vehicles 
 
0.1 
 
1.6 
 
6.4 
 
1.7 
 
2.9 
 
3.0 
 
4.5 
on Russian Railways         
statistics         
 
Machines, Machine Tools, Engines 0.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 2.4 3.0 
 
Metalware 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 5.9 10.3 
Chemicals and Sodium Carbonate 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.1 1.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.11. 
Changes in and 
Commodity Struc- 
ture of, Export 
by EU Countries 
to China of Cargoes 
Switchable to Rail- 
way Container 
Transport, 2007–
2016, 
Thousand Tons 
 
Source: 
UNCTAD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finished Food 
Products 
 
 
 
Cellulose, Paper, 
Printed Products 
 
 
 
Clothing, 
Footwear, Textile 
Products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 7 8 5 10 10 9 8 6 8 
 
 
4 
 
 
7 
 
 
6 
 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
37 44 85 53 67 68 64 67 71 75 
 
Metals and Metal 
Products 
37 26 28 26 22 22 15 12 16 32 
Machines, 
Equipment, 
Industrial Products 
 
2,113 2,182 2,199 3,120 3,636 3,544 3,784 4,067 3,53 3,592 
 
TOTAL, 
Thousand Tons 
2,237 2,325 2,370 3,278 3,821 3,734 3,965 4,248 3,749 3,820 
TOTAL, 
Thousand FEU 
102 106 108 149 174 170 180 193 170 174 
including 
Main Commodity Groups 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
Other Cargoes 0.6 3.0 8.6 3.0 5.8 14.2 24.1 
of which: 
 
Paper 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.1 
 
Industrial Consumer Goods 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 
 
Commodity 
Groups 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
 
Finished Chemical 
Products 
42 59 44 68 80 82 86 88 96 106 
 
Textile Fibre, 
Fabrics, Raw Hide 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A2.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
Finished Food Products 
 
 
Cellulose, Paper, 
Printed Products 
 
 
 
Clothing, Footwear, 
Textile Products 
 
 
Machines, Equipment, 
Industrial Products 
Changes in, 
Commodity and 
Geographical 
Structure of, Export 
by EAEU Member 
States to the EU 
of Cargoes Switch- 
able to Railway 
Container Trans- 
port, 2007–2016, 
Thousand Tons/ 
Thousand FEU 
 
Source: 
UNCTAD 
 
TOTAL, Thousand Tons 503 516 407 405 364 449 459 478 490 488 
including 
Russia 
 
Kazakhstan 18 18 10 7 9 14 9 6 11 14 
Belarus 
 
Armenia 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 4 2 2 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
TOTAL, Thousand FEU 25 26 20 20 18 22 23 24 24 24 
 
 
Table A2.13. 
Changes in, 
Commodity and 
Geographical 
Structure of, Import 
by EAEU Member 
States from the EU 
of Cargoes Switch- 
able to Railway 
Container Trans- 
port, 2007–2016, 
Thousand Tons/ 
Thousand FEU 
 
Source: 
UNCTAD 
 
TOTAL, Thousand Tons 5,005    5,282    3,066 3,769   4,832 5,581 5,334 4,672   2,968 3,126 
including 
 
Kazakhstan 518 298 247 157 150 205 265 239 195 146 
 
Armenia 20 20 13 16 17 18 18 18 25 15 
 
TOTAL, Thousand FEU 250 264 153 188 242 279 267 234 148 156 
Commodity Groups 
and Countries 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
 
Finished Chemical Products 9 10 8 7 9 11 11 11 12 13 
 
Textile Fibre, Fabrics, 
Raw Hide 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Metals and Metal Products 220 238 213 213 166 264 277 281 259 197 
 
Commodity Groups 
and Countries 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
 
Finished Chemical Products 402 407 354 392 397 417 422 417 355 362 
 
Textile Fibre, Fabrics, Raw 
Hide
 0
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Metals and Metal Products 4 3 2 2 8 16 14 3 3 2 
 
Finished Food Products 
 
 
Cellulose, Paper, Printed 
64 51 40 39 36 33 35 43 29 34 
Products 
185 199 136 141 150 138 129 114 64 53 
 
Clothing, Footwear, Textile 
Products 
 
 
154 
 
 
170 
 
 
124 
 
 
144 
 
 
145 
 
 
148 
 
 
140 
 
 
142 
 
 
98 
 
 
122 
 
Machines, Equipment, 
Industrial Products 
 
4,196 
 
4,452 
 
2,409 
 
3,050 
 
4,097 
 
4,828 
 
4,594 
 
3,952 
 
2,420 
 
2,554 
 
 
Russia 
 
 
4,203 
 
 
4,597 
 
 
2,477 
 
 
3,284 
 
 
4,321 
 
 
4,934 
 
 
4,622 
 
 
3,921 
 
 
2,519 
 
 
2,731 
 
Belarus 
 
254 
 
357 
 
318 
 
277 
 
303 
 
364 
 
371 
 
419 
 
212 
 
221 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
10 
 
11 
 
10 
 
35 
 
41 
 
61 
 
58 
 
74 
 
18 
 
14 
 
9 10 7 3 3 4 3 6 4 4 
 
7 
 
6 
 
5 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
25 
 
 
24 
 
 
18 
 
 
18 
 
 
18 
 
 
16 
 
 
16 
 
 
17 
 
 
17 
 
 
19 
 
234 
 
229 
 
155 
 
159 
 
164 
 
149 
 
150 
 
161 
 
196 
 
252 
 
 
423 
 
 
438 
 
 
347 
 
 
344 
 
 
299 
 
 
381 
 
 
402 
 
 
415 
 
 
425 
 
 
412 
 
60 
 
56 
 
47 
 
52 
 
53 
 
50 
 
45 
 
51 
 
50 
 
59 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
  
 
